David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289 (2006)
Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. I begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Christine A. Skarda & Walter J. Freeman (1987). How Brains Make Chaos in Order to Make Sense of the World. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):161.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabian Dorsch (2015). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
Nick Zangwill (2013). Love: Gloriously Amoral and Arational. Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):298 - 314.
Nick Zangwill (2012). Rationality and Moral Realism. Ratio 25 (3):345-364.
Similar books and articles
Danilo Suster (2001). Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.
Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Sven Walter (2007). The Epistemological Approach to Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):273 - 285.
R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Renée Bilodeau (1993). L'inertie du mental. Dialogue 32 (03):507-525.
Jakob Hohwy (2004). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377 - 400.
Graham Macdonald (2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads160 ( #24,239 of 1,934,573 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #41,660 of 1,934,573 )
How can I increase my downloads?