Moral mind-independence
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):205 – 219 (1994)
| Abstract | ist', who thinks that moral judgements cognize a range of real moral facts, states of affairs or situations. In the other corner, there is the 'projectivist', who thinks that moral judgements express non-cognitive states ââ¬â such as attitudes, emotions, or desiresââ¬â | |||||||||
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