I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, or for not sccing that thc projcctivist option is 0pcn at all. Surcly hc has a point hcrc. The prcjudicc of assuming that philosophy is always conccmcd to proffcr analyses of meaning has meant that thc projcctivist option tcndcd to bc overlooked.; Projcctivism is an cxplanation of what wc arc doing when wc moralizc. It docs not pursue a meaning rcduction; it allows that moral terms havc a distinctive meaning. Blackburn also makes an analogous point in various other areas bcsidcs moral philosophy, such as thc philosophy of causality, probability, and conditionals.
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DOI 10.2307/2108166
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Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.

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