Synthese 97 (3):287 - 296 (1993)
|Abstract||For any area of our thought — moral, modal, scientihc, or theological we can ask what explains the way we think. After all, we might never have thought in such terms, or that sort of thought might have been different from the way it is. So there must be some explanation of why it is as it is. Such an explanation would be part of a naturalistic account of the mind.|
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