Quasi-realist explanation

Synthese 97 (3):287 - 296 (1993)
For any area of our thought — moral, modal, scientihc, or theological we can ask what explains the way we think. After all, we might never have thought in such terms, or that sort of thought might have been different from the way it is. So there must be some explanation of why it is as it is. Such an explanation would be part of a naturalistic account of the mind.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064071
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References found in this work BETA
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Simon Blackburn (1980). Opinions and Chances. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 175--96.
Nick Zangwill (1990). Quasi-Quasi-Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.

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