Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79 (1993)
|Abstract||In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Modality Monism Supervenience Blackburn, S Davidson, D|
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