Two dogmas of Kantian aesthetics
|Abstract||How do aesthetic judgements differ from ordinary empirical judgements? It is widely accepted that one important respect in which judgements of taste differ from empirical judgements is that they are based on some kind of felt reaction or response — typically a pleasure or displeasure. This doctrine gained its classic statement in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. And it is the basis for the prevalent view that in aesthetics, we must ’judge for ourselves’. The doctrine is generally taken to imply that a judgement which is not based on such a reaction is not a judgement of taste.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Immanuel Kant (2007/2005). Critique of Judgement. Oxford University Press.
Dabney Townsend (2003). Cohen on Kant's Aesthetic Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):75-79.
Malcolm Budd (2008). Aesthetic Essays. Oxford University Press.
Bart Vandenabeele (2008). The Subjective Universality of Aesthetic Judgements Revisited. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4):410-425.
Ted Cohen (2002). Three Problems in Kant's Aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (1):1-12.
Elisabeth Schellekens (2006). Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):163-177.
Malcolm Budd (2007). The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (4):333-371.
Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant on the Normativity of Taste: The Role of Aesthetic Ideas. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):415 – 433.
Caj Strandberg (2011). A Structural Disanalogy Between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (1):51-67.
Miles Rind (2003). Kant's Beautiful Roses: A Response to Cohen's ‘Second Problem’. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):65-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #55,649 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?