The normativity of the mental

Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19 (2005)
Abstract
I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children.
Keywords Essentialism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,269
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Nick Zangwill (2009). Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.
Nick Zangwill (2006). Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289.

View all 9 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

78 ( #15,864 of 1,096,245 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #17,851 of 1,096,245 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.