The normativity of the mental

Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19 (2005)
Abstract
I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children.
Keywords Essentialism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Normativity
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Nick Zangwill (2009). Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.
    Nick Zangwill (2006). Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289.

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