David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Among the book's arguments: Aesthetic property relativism, as described by Alan Goldman, requires subjects to make judgments based on prima facie preferences for determinable properties (eg being curved, being blue). These judgments are not bona fide because they do not require acquaintance with objects. Value concepts and aesthetic (thick) concepts relate contingently. We can be aesthetic property realists, or quasi-realists, without being aesthetic value realists. Contains epistemological arguments against neuro-aesthetics (Ramachandran), aesthetic sense theory (Hutcheson), physiological theories (Burke), and Hume's realism.
|Keywords||value aesthetic value neuro-aesthetics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Y. Saito (2010). Everyday Aesthetics. Oxford University Press.
Amir Konigsberg (2012). The Acquaintance Principle, Aesthetic Autonomy, and Aesthetic Appreciation. British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (2):153-168.
Aaron Meskin (2004). Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn From Others About Beauty and Art? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
Alan H. Goldman (1995). Aesthetic Value. Westview Press.
Rafael de Clercq (2005). Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):27–32.
Nick Zangwill (2005). Aesthetic Realism 1. In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. Oup Oxford.
Rafael De Clercq (2002). The Concept of an Aesthetic Property. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (2):167–176.
Malcolm Budd (2008). Aesthetic Essays. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-05-29
Total downloads39 ( #37,028 of 1,089,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,801 of 1,089,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?