David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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conditional with his discussions of the hypothetical proposition. Peirce spoke often of the consequentia de inesse ,1 the concept of which is intimately linked with the material, or "Philonian" conditional; indeed, we shall see him calling himself a Philonian. And it is not uncommon to hear Peirce—at least prior to the last decade of his life—declared a Philonian, whose fundamental analysis of the conditional was essentially the same as that of Philo (and of more modern types like Russell and like Quine).
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