Peirce and Philo

conditional with his discussions of the hypothetical proposition. Peirce spoke often of the consequentia de inesse ,1 the concept of which is intimately linked with the material, or "Philonian" conditional; indeed, we shall see him calling himself a Philonian. And it is not uncommon to hear Peirce—at least prior to the last decade of his life—declared a Philonian, whose fundamental analysis of the conditional was essentially the same as that of Philo (and of more modern types like Russell and like Quine).
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