Intentions are mental states
Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242 (2006)
| Abstract | Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states. | |||||||||
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