David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The grue paradox, also called the new riddle of induction, posed a great challenge to the common understanding about induction. This paper shows that there is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. This paper presents a general form of the grue predicate. Based on the general form, this paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and prediction.
|Keywords||The grue paradox Induction the new riddle of induction|
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