Understanding volition

Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):247-274 (2004)
Abstract
The concept of volition has a long history in Western thought, but is looked upon unfavorably in contemporary philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes and elaborates a unifying conception of volition, which views volition as a mediating executive mental process that bridges the gaps between an agent's deliberation, decision and voluntary bodily action. Then the paper critically examines three major skeptical arguments against volition: volition is a mystery, volition is an illusion, and volition is a fundamentally flawed conception that leads to infinite regress. It is shown that all these charges are untenable and the arguments are far from decisive to dismiss the concept of volition. In addition, it is suggested that a naturalistic approach, which takes philosophical inquiry as continuous with the scientific study of volition, is a promising way to demystify volition
Keywords Illusion  Infinite Regress  Metaphysics  Mystery  Volition
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/0951508042000239066
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,357
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jing Zhu (2004). Locating Volition. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):302-322.
Edmund Henden (2008). What is Self-Control? Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

103 ( #39,737 of 1,911,315 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #113,677 of 1,911,315 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.