Graduate studies at Western
Idealistic Studies 37 (1):51-66 (2007)
|Abstract||The article tries to explain Wittgenstein’s thesis “death is not an event in life.” Death is neither a positive nor a negative fact, but a one-time event. Death is an event, which, not belonging to the world, constitutes the limit of all possible experience, and as such, it is inaccessible to any form of consciousness. Whileconstituting the end of the subject as a prerequisite of the world, death is also the final annihilation of existence as such. The above analysis shows that Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist. According to him death is not an event in life because: (1) it is the death of the subject, and the transcendental subject does not belong to the world, (2) the transcendental subject is a condition of the world, so the death of the subject is the end of the world|
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