Realism Redux: Gibson's Affordances Get a Well-Deserved Update

Constructivist Foundations 7 (1):87-89 (2011)
Abstract
Upshot: Chemero provides a modern re-interpretation of Gibson’s ecological psychology and his affordance concept that is more coherent than the original and in line with antirepresentationalist, dynamical theories in embodied cognitive science. He argues for a radical embodied cognitive science, in which ecological and enactive approaches join forces against the more watered-down, mainstream embodied cognitive science that still maintains traditional commitments to representationalism and computationalism. He also defends a special version of realism, entity realism, which many constructivists might not find entirely convincing, but which is nevertheless more or less compatible with enactive theories of embodied cognition
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Andrea Scarantino (2003). Affordances Explained. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961.
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