Against relativism [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348 (2007)
Abstract
Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jeffrey C. King (2003). Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):195–246.
    John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
    John MacFarlane (2005). The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. In Tamar Szabo Gendler John Hawthorne (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 197--234.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
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