Basic self-knowledge: Answering Peacocke's criticisms of constitutivism
Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379 (2006)
| Abstract | Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge. | |||||||||
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Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
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Christopher Peacocke (1999). Being Known. Oxford University Press.
Larry A. Herzberg (2008). Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation (Christopher Peacocke). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
Paul Katsafanas (2011). Deriving Ethics From Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.
Herman Philipse (1994). Peacocke on Concepts. Inquiry 37 (2):225 – 252.
Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117 - 158.
Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford.
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