Luck and moral responsibility

Ethics 97 (2):374-386 (1987)
Abstract
The following argument is addressed: (1) a person is morally responsible for an event's occurring only if that event's occurring was not a matter of luck; (2) no event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck; therefore, (3) no event is such that someone is morally responsible for its occurring. Two notions of control are distinguished: restricted and complete. (2) is shown false on the first interpretation, (1) on the second. The discussion involves a distinction between resultant and situational luck, And it is argued that, Even when luck's role in life, And the unfairness that stems from it, Is acknowledged, Moral responsibility remains possible
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Tamler Sommers (2009). More Work for Hard Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.
    David Enoch (2010). Moral Luck and the Law. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
    Tamler Sommers (2007). The Objective Attitude. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.

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