Partiality and Intrinsic Value

Mind 120 (478):447-483 (2011)
Abstract
The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these and other responses and then offers a response that, it is claimed, solves the challenge
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,612
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Similar books and articles
Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.
Robert Heeger (2005). Reasonable Partiality to Domestic Animals. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):123 - 139.
Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.
Brenda Almond (2005). Reasonable Partiality in Professional Relationships. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):155 - 168.
Christine Tappolet (2008). Friendship and Partiality in Ethics. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 3 (1).
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-06-26

Total downloads

39 ( #42,667 of 1,098,417 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #21,938 of 1,098,417 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.