Abstract

Chapter Four of Richard Gale’s On the Nature and Existence of God constitutes an ambitious 80-page monograph on the “free will defense” (FWD). Much of Gale’s argument is aimed at Plantinga’s FWD, but the scope of his criticism extends, finally, to all versions. Gale’s main contentions are that: (i) no version of the FWD can get off the ground without the substantive, true conditionals often called “counterfactuals of human freedom” by contemporary Molinists; (ii) the best theory of these conditionals (Gale’s “minimalism”) implies that the Molinists’ conditionals are true (so traditional omniscience requires that God know them, as the Molinists allege that he does); (iii) but Molinism would make God a puppet-master, and incapable of creating free persons after all. Gale concludes that proponents of the FWD must accept that there are contingent truths God does not know. I argue that Gale’s objections to non-Molinist versions of FWD are easily rebutted; but that his criticisms of Molinism have considerably more bite.