David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 59 (4):401–457 (2005)
The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name “taking tense seriously”; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called “tensed theories of time”). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an “eternalist” version of the A-theory collapses into merely “taking tense seriously” — a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth.
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1992). The Nature of Necessity. Clarendon Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan D. Jacobs (2010). A Powers Theory of Modality: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):227-248.
Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
Thorben Petersen (2016). The Grounding Problem for Eternalism. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1819-1852.
Bradford Skow (2012). Why Does Time Pass? Noûs 46 (2):223-242.
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Michael Tooley (2000). Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
Dean Zimmerman (2011). Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press 163--246.
Michael J. Futch (2002). Leibniz's Non-Tensed Theory of Time. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):125 – 139.
Heather Dyke (2001). The Pervasive Paradox of Tense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):103-124.
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