David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37 (1991)
The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the conceivability of a certain state of affairs to the logical possibility of that state of affairs
|Keywords||Dualism Social Philosophy Soul Descartes Swinburne, R|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
John Spackman (2013). Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.
Similar books and articles
Jason T. Eberl (2010). Varieties of Dualism. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.
Eleonore Stump (1995). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism. Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
Sarah Broadie (2001). Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):295–308.
Michael McGhee (1996). The Locations of the Soul. Religious Studies 32 (2):205 - 221.
Marleen Rozemond (2014). The Faces of Simplicity in Descartes’s Soul. In Dominik Perler & Klaus Corcilius (eds.), Partitioning the Soul: Debates From Plato to Leibniz. De Gruyter 219-244.
William P. Alston & Thomas W. Smythe (1994). Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-33.
Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann (1996). An Objection to Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):405-412.
M. Pakaluk (2003). Degrees of Separation in the "Phaedo". Phronesis 48 (2):89 - 115.
Richard Swinburne (1996). Dualism Intact. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):68 - 77.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #75,582 of 1,699,799 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #161,079 of 1,699,799 )
How can I increase my downloads?