Two cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul

American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37 (1991)
The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the conceivability of a certain state of affairs to the logical possibility of that state of affairs
Keywords Dualism  Social Philosophy  Soul  Descartes  Swinburne, R
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Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.

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