The nature of belief
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82 (2007)
| Abstract | Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to behaviour than most contemporary functionalists allow. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief | |||||||||
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