David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 72 (1):17 - 35 (2010)
There is growing interest in understanding and eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists. This paper illustrates the need for this division of labor through a historical example, and a formal model is presented to better analyze situations of this type. Analysis of this model reveals that a division of labor can be maintained in two different ways: by limiting information or by endowing the scientists with extreme beliefs. If both features are present however, cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely, and as a result agents fail to converge to the truth. Beyond the mechanisms for creating diversity suggested here, this shows that the real epistemic goal is not diversity but transient diversity.
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References found in this work BETA
J. McKenzie Alexander (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Philip Kitcher (2002). 14 Social Psychology and the Theory of Science. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. 263.
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Citations of this work BETA
Boaz Miller (2013). When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement. Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2011). Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics. Erkenntnis 75 (2):271-283.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2012). Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique. [REVIEW] Res Publica 18 (3):241-258.
Kevin J. S. Zollman (2013). Network Epistemology: Communication in Epistemic Communities. Philosophy Compass 8 (1):15-27.
Ryan Muldoon (2013). Diversity and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):117-125.
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