David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209 (2011)
Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ?saturated? and some ?unsaturated?. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ?saturated/unsaturated? distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ?wild analyses?, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because any ?unsaturated? sense that is a mode of presentation of a concept together with any ?saturated? sense forms a thought. The reason is that any concept can be applied to any object (which is presented by a ?saturated? sense). This stems from the fact that Frege was willing to admit only total functions. It is also briefly suggested what should be done to block wild analyses
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References found in this work BETA
Wolfgang Carl (1994). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge University Press.
Gottlob Frege (1991). Posthumous Writings. Wiley-Blackwell.
Gottlob Frege (1953/1968). The Foundations of Arithmetic. Evanston, Ill.,Northwestern University Press.
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