Logique inductive et soutien probabiliste

Dialogue 32 (2):293- (1993)
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Abstract

Karl Popper et David Miller ont soutenu l'idée selon laquelle le soutien probabiliste positif = p − p > 0) que e apporte á h, lorsque de h on déduit e, ne justifie en rien l'espoir de pouvoir construire une logique inductive fondée sur le calcul des probabilityés.

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Denis Zwirn
École Polytechnique

Citations of this work

Metaconfirmation.Denis Zwirn & Herv� P. Zwirn - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):195-228.

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References found in this work

On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.
Dualling: A critique of an argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.
Logique Inductive et Probabilité.Maurice Boudot - 1975 - Mind 84 (334):308-310.

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