International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):197-217 (2012)
|Abstract||In this essay, I argue, via a revision of Freud's notions of primary and secondary process, that experiences of resonant form lie at the root of many serious ineffability claims. I suggest further that Western European culture's resistance to the perception of resonant form underlies some of its present crises|
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