Normativity and moral psychology : the social intuitionist model and a world without normative moral rules?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law. Copernicus Center Press (2011)
The paper pores over the recent conceptions of normative judgement developed against the background of advances in psychology and neuroscience. It begins by analyzing what normative claim of morality and law consists of before presenting and criticizing the Social Intuitionist Model of normative judgement developed by Jonathan Haidt. The model poses serious challenges for well-established normative concepts, and the concept of normativity as objective reason for action in particular. A question is asked of what the relationship between philosophical conceptions and the findings of neuroscience should be. The conclusion is that, in the face of new scientific facts, philosophers have no choice but to carefully revise their conceptual schemes.
|Keywords||normative judgment normativity law rule-following|
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James M. Huebner (2014). Moral Psychology and the Intuition That Pharmaceutical Companies Have a ‘Special’ Obligation to Society. Journal of Buisness Ethics (3):1-10.
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