Online research in philosophy

John Dewey's writings make a compelling case for the importance of linking school and society and for conceiving education as the development and articulation of lived experience. In recent years, however, a focus on discrete topical learning, along with narrow definitions of achievement, have left us with few good examples of that conception of education. The best examples often represent one-time experiences, or more limited linking of school and society.This article explores an example of what we call community inquiry1, as (...) it has developed within a school and community life. The community's inquiry builds on student experiences and exemplifies integrated curriculum, community-based learning, projects .. (shrink)

In March 1928, John Dewey responded to a request from Marie Meloney, editor of the New York Herald-Tribune Sunday Magazine, and offered his recommendations on recently published texts on education. Dewey wrote, "I think the best educational books of recent publication are Bode, Modern Educational Theories . . . Kilpatrick, Education for a Changing Civilization . . . & Martin, The Meaning of a Liberal Education".1 This was not the first time Dewey recommended Everett Dean Martin's book. In 1927, the (...) editors of the Journal of the National Education Association approached Dewey and asked, "What book have you recently found especially worthwhile? Something that you have read easily, eagerly, and with profit—either in .. (shrink)

One of us is a teacher educator (Margaret) and the other is a prospective teacher (Andrew). In our experiences within these roles, we increasingly see and hear little educative concern for the epistemological question "What counts as knowledge?" alongside the ontological question "What does it mean to be a teacher in classrooms?" Instead of grappling with these questions, curricular enactment in many classrooms proceeds through tightly controlled conditions with criteria that insist on pre-determined management modes with little time or space (...) for teachers to ask what ought to count as knowledge or what teaching for student understanding might feel and look like in practice. At the same time, many teachers are .. (shrink)

Richard Gale's slender monograph is a sometimes insightful, sometimes enervating and always personal reckoning with John Dewey's philosophy. Gale's basic thesis is that Dewey is a unificationist malgré lui, that despite being committed to empiricism and pluralism his pragmatism remains profoundly metaphysical in a non-naturalistic sense. This claim is hardly new or surprising. Thinkers as diverse as George Santayana, Richard Rorty and John Patrick Diggins, to name but a few, have also noted traces of supernaturalism and monism throughout Dewey's corpus. (...) Moreover, recent works including Victor Kestenbaum's The Grace and Severity of the Ideal (Chicago 2002), James Good's A Search for Unity and Diversity (Lexington .. (shrink)

In his landmark work, Democracy and Education, John Dewey (1916/1980) proposed that "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (93). Given this, he argued, the role of the system of public education in a democracy must not only facilitate individual development, but do so in a way that simultaneously attends to the larger social good. Preparation for vocation was central to this effort, understood not as narrow technical (...) training, but rather as "such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates" (316). The threat .. (shrink)

Welcome readers!As you have no doubt noted, Education & Culture has an all new cover design and formatting thanks to our good friends at PUP. I hope folks like it. I think we can at least be sure that Dewey would approve of the color!But that is not all that is new. There are some other important changes readers should know about concerning access to the journal. Following current practice, Dewey Society members will continue to receive the journal in hard (...) copy, with the most recent three years still available online through Project Muse. However, a new archive has been established to make issues older than three years available Open Access through Purdue e-Pubs, the online publishing platform of Purdue .. (shrink)

In his recent book, Creative Actualization: A Meliorist Theory of Values, Hugh McDonald wades into the murky waters of value theory in order to develop a uniquely pragmatist theory of value. He ties value to what he calls "creative actualizations," or the process of introducing novelties, conditions, norms and principles into our individual and collective experience. Creative actualization accommodates a plurality of independent values, resisting the temptation to embrace a monist framework, whether by making our diverse values instrumental to a (...) final end or relative to a single (objective or subjective) source. Moreover, as McDonald argues, creative actualization has the theoretical resources to underpin a .. (shrink)

John Shook and James Good have each made significant contributions to the scholarly discussion of John Dewey's "permanent Hegelian deposit." In this collection, they come together to further develop their respective analyses of Dewey's Hegelianism. The volume combines two essays, one from each of the authors, in addition to the "definitive text" of Dewey's own 1897 lecture on Hegel, given at the University of Chicago, and entitled "Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit." In comparison to Shook's earlier, more comprehensive work on Dewey's (...) relationship to Hegel, Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000), and Good's similarly intensive treatment, A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian .. (shrink)

The importance of moral education and teachers' moral authority based on Confucianism1 has long remained the central feature of Korean education. Korean society, traditionally, not only granted teachers the same authority as parents, but more significantly, attributed to them even greater responsibility for children's moral and intellectual development (Sorensen, 1994, 27-28). In a circumstance in which the teacher is regarded as a moral exemplar and is given remarkable authority by parents to develop their children's moral character, as Sorenson (1994) observed, (...) "the teacher's word is law . . . The teacher's proper role is to impart truth. It is a rare student that would question a teacher's authority, whatever .. (shrink)

John Dewey developed sophisticated theories for a liberal civil society and a deliberative democracy. These theories have recently enjoyed renewed attention, discussion, and practical application.1 However, no consensus on Dewey's primary theoretical strategies has yet emerged.2 What precisely was Dewey's justification for democracy and its superiority over other ways of life and forms of government? This essay explains how Dewey attempted to formulate a philosophical justification for democracy on ethical grounds, rather than just epistemic or satisfaction-maximization grounds alone. Provided with (...) a solid ethical foundation, progressive and participatory democracy could become a practical, achievable, and highly .. (shrink)

According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I (...) argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible. (shrink)

There exist several phenomena breaking the classical probability laws. The systems related to such phenomena are context-dependent, so that they are adaptive to other systems. In this paper, we present a new mathematical formalism to compute the joint probability distribution for two event-systems by using concepts of the adaptive dynamics and quantum information theory, e.g., quantum channels and liftings. In physics the basic example of the context-dependent phenomena is the famous double-slit experiment. Recently similar examples have been found in biological (...) and psychological sciences. Our approach is an extension of traditional quantum probability theory, and it is general enough to describe aforementioned contextual phenomena outside of quantum physics. (shrink)

Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum predictions concerning the correlations of measurement outcomes. Here we prove that the argument is basically flawed by an inappropriate use of the assumption of free will. In particular, among other implications, the claim, if correct, would imply that Bohmian Mechanics is incompatible with free will. This (...) statement, appearing in the paper, derives from the unjustified identification of free will with the no-signaling constraint and of a purely formal and not physical use of such a constraint. (shrink)

Seinfeld (1989–1998) and it’s co-creator’s Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000–present), are each considered groundbreaking television. Critics regard their humor and intellectual comedy as Twain-like and creative. While both shows have been criticized for their character’s indifference and apolitical attitude, the programs resonate with those in society who more subtly consider law and politics. This project argues that Seinfeld and Curb present a unique theory of justice. These two shows constitute a common and current image of what is just in society. While (...) critics have argued that Seinfeld and Curb are not shows about nothing, I argue that these comedians offer us a legal philosophy. For those who view these characters as merely “self-absorbed, superficial, and immature,” I posit that they represent the obscure area between what John Locke termed “the state of nature” and what legal scholars call “legal culture.” I propose that these sitcoms demonstrate a way of speaking about law that provides a constitutive theory of law and justice. (shrink)

Since its inception, donor conception practices have been a reproductive choice for the infertile. Past and current practices have the potential to cause significant and lifelong harm to the offspring through loss of kinship, heritage, identity, and family health history, and possibly through introducing physical problems. Legislation and regulation in Australia that specifies that the welfare of the child born as a consequence of donor conception is paramount may therefore be in conflict with the outcomes. Altering the paradigm to a (...) child-centric model, however, impinges on reproductive choice and rights of adults involved in the process. With some lobby groups pushing for increased reproductive choice while others emphasise offspring rights there is a dichotomy of interests that society and legislators need to address. Concepts pertaining to a shift toward a child-centric paradigm are discussed. (shrink)

This paper deals with one kind of Kripke-style semantics, which we shall call algebraic Kripke-style semantics, for relevance logics. We first recall the logic R of relevant implication and some closely related systems, their corresponding algebraic structures, and algebraic completeness results. We provide simpler algebraic completeness proofs. We then introduce various types of algebraic Kripke-style semantics for these systems and connect them with algebraic semantics.

Among Platonic images that have engaged John Sallis’s thought on Plato, the second voyage of Socrates, his deuteros plous, recurs often and provocatively. It is not too much to suggest that deuteros plous has occasioned many of Sallis’s own voyages, as well as suggesting a fruitful image of the philosopher as voyager that may be gleaned from these peculiar journeys. This essay will consist of four brief sections. The first will focus upon Sallis’s earliest reading of deuteros plous in Being (...) and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue (the title of its first edition, to me the best title), in which he provides a sustained reading of Phaedo 95e–102a, in the heart of which Socrates’s second voyage is brought .. (shrink)

I love the variety of the philosophers, as I love the variety of the thoughtful looks which light up earnest young faces. The 1892 publication of Josiah Royce’s history of modern philosophy marks a watershed for anglophone works on this topic. Royce’s opus offered readers not only an important text by America’s most rapidly emerging philosopher but also a homegrown history that could compete with the very best German texts on the subject. Quite apart from the author’s (1892/1955, xii) prefatory (...) claim that the history of philosophy was flourishing at the time, most historical studies in English were rather plain abstractions from German scholarship.1 Recent years had seen translations of the general .. (shrink)

One will never be able to interrogate wonder philosophically except by way of a questioning that the operation of wonder will already have determined. It is a well-known teaching in the writings of both Plato and Aristotle that wonder (thauma) is the beginning of philosophy. But few philosophers have given wonder much thought—certainly, no philosopher that I am aware of has, like Professor Sallis, returned time and again to think through wonder. Sallis’s thinking through wonder is guided by his reading (...) of ancient Greek philosophy, and furthermore, as I hope to show, it opens up a reengagement with Greek philosophers—in particular, with those early Greek thinkers who are known collectively as the .. (shrink)

Scholars who engage with texts that were written by George Herbert Mead (e.g., 1925e.g., 1926e.g., 1929e.g., 1932e.g., 1938) in the latter half of the 1920s are faced with the task of comprehending Mead’s interpretation of relativity theory and also understanding why relativity theory was considered by Mead to have such profound implications for his own philosophy. As several scholars of Mead’s work have explained (e.g., Joas 1997; Martin 2007; Rosenthal and Bourgeois 1991), Mead was a realist. Mead opposed psychophysical dualism (...) (Cook 1979) and both the behaviorist and the idealist implications that could follow from such a dualism. He wanted to explain human conduct in terms of the self-determination of human .. (shrink)

The American pragmatist John Dewey was no stranger to the problems of economics and their effects on the quality of work experience. Indeed, in his Democracy and Education (1916/1985), he remarks that “the greatest evil of the present regime is not found in poverty and in the suffering which it entails, but in the fact that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them, which are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues” (MW 9:326–27). This was (...) not a uniquely American problem, as he continued to discuss the “problem of labor” in his lectures in China from 1919 to 1921. There his analysis of education and what it has to contribute to capitalistic economies takes on a more comparative shade .. (shrink)

I know of nothing that has caused me to dream more on Plato’s secrecy and his sphinx nature than the happily preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his deathbed there was found no “Bible,” nothing Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic—but a volume of Aristophanes. How could even a Plato have endured life—a Greek life to which he said No—without an Aristophanes? Diogenes Laertius reports that Plato was reputed to have been so “well regulated”(kosmiois) as never once to have been (...) seen to “laugh excessively” (gelôn huperagan . . . kômikôn).1 Nietzsche describes Plato as so humorless as to be positively “boring” (1968, 117). John Sallis not only ascribes to this notoriously solemn philosopher a sense of .. (shrink)

The philosophy of nature has become virtually an oxymoron for the prevailing philosophical consensus. Reason, we are told, is powerless to conceive what nature is in itself but must instead hand over all understanding of physical reality to empirical science. Philosophy may reflect upon how natural science models its data, scrutinizing the consistency of scientific theories and the way research projects are framed, but reason must never go beyond its frail limits to provide a priori ampliative, synthetic knowledge of what (...) holds universally and necessarily of nature. Insofar as the problems of knowing nature a priori apply to any extension of a priori knowledge beyond reason’s knowledge of itself, philosophy should .. (shrink)

It is a standard requirement of democratic theory that all members of society be treated with equal respect as capable of self-determination (Christiano 2004; Dworkin 1977; Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Patten 2011; Waldron 1999). The fulfillment of this requirement is problematic vis-à-vis conscientious dissenters. Conscientious dissenters refuse to comply with legally enforced duties when compliance risks jeopardizing their moral integrity, because the required behavior would compromise their loyalty to (some of) their moral commitments. Coercing conscientious dissenters into behavior they deem (...) morally wrong, qua contrary to their conscience, amounts to disrespect because it threatens their capacity for .. (shrink)

Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are an issue of growing public health significance. This set of neurodevelopmental disorders, which includes autistic disorder, Asperger syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), is characterized by abnormalities in one or more of the following domains: language use, reciprocal social interactions, and/or a pattern of restricted interests or stereotyped behaviors. Prevalence estimates for ASDs have been increasing over the past few decades, with estimates at ~5/10,000 in the 1960s, and current estimates as high (...) as 1/88 (Newschaffer et al. 2007; CDC 2012).1 While ASDs encompass a wide range of phenotypes and degrees of severity, the disorders .. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to lay out the major aspects of a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in ethics. This account is “procedural” insofar as it holds that the objectivity of inquiry depends not on what the results of that inquiry are, but rather whether the proper procedure of inquiry was followed to generate the results. The account is “pragmatic” insofar as it coheres with a broader approach to ethics that conceives of ethical inquiry and progress in terms of (...) resolving problems (Roth 2010a, 2012). Why should we want this sort of account of ethical objectivity? In addition to its contribution to a larger pragmatist conception of ethical inquiry, this account has two desirable features. First .. (shrink)

Recent research has begun to investigate sensory processing in relation to nonclinical variation in traits associated with the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We propose that existing accounts of autistic perception can be augmented by considering a role for individual differences in top-down expectations for the precision of sensory input, related to the processing of state-dependent levels of uncertainty. We therefore examined ASD-like traits in relation to the rubber-hand illusion: an experimental paradigm that typically elicits crossmodal integration of visual, tactile, and (...) proprioceptive information in an unusual illusory context. Individuals with higher ASD-like traits showed reduced effects of the rubber-hand illusion on perceived arm position and reach-to-grasp movements, compared to individuals with lower ASD-like traits. These differences occurred despite both groups reporting the typical subjective experience of the illusion concerning visuotactile integration and ownership for the rubber hand. Together these results suggest that the integration of proprioceptive information with cues for arm position derived from the illusory context differs between individuals partly in relation to traits associated with ASD. We suggest that the observed differences in sensory integration can be best explained in terms of differing expectations regarding the precision of sensory estimates in contexts that suggest uncertainty. (shrink)

I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far-reaching consequences for our account (...) of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence. (shrink)

Bayesians have traditionally taken a dim view of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), arguing that, if IBE is at variance with Bayes' rule, then it runs afoul of the dynamic Dutch book argument. More recently, Bayes' rule has been claimed to be superior on grounds of conduciveness to our epistemic goal. The present paper aims to show that neither of these arguments succeeds in undermining IBE.

You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival (...) of each stranger for its own sake. Secondly, you are rationally required to achieve as many of these ends as possible, if you have these ends. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve. This belief is sometimes used by defenders of so-called ‘non-ideal theories of justice’ to criticise so-called ‘ideal theories of justice’. I refer to this claim as ‘the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice’ and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a willingness to apply the label ‘unjust’ to some regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance (...) the action-guiding potential of a conception of justice, by providing an aspirational ideal. This is possible on the condition that, at all times, we cannot specify with certainty the limits of what is feasible for us collectively. The rejection of the feasibility constraint entails that there can be injustice without perpetrators; this is a theoretical price worth paying. (shrink)

Many epistemologists are attracted to the claim that knowledge possession excludes luck. Virtue epistemologists attempt to clarify this idea by holding that knowledge requires apt belief: belief that is true because of an agent's epistemic virtues, and not because of luck. Thinking about aptness may have the potential to make progress on important questions in epistemology, but first we must possess an adequate account of when a belief is true because of luck. Existing treatments of aptness assume a simple and (...) natural view of luck attribution, according to which the success of a performance is attributable to luck if one of the principal causes of the success is a lucky event. I show that this view is false, and should be replaced. This has major implications for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge, as well as the role of luck in epistemology more generally. (shrink)

Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also (...) show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common for philosophers to make use of the concept of artistic value, and, further, to distinguish artistic value from aesthetic value. In a recent paper, ‘The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’, Dominic Lopes takes issue with this, presenting a kind of corrective to current philosophical practice regarding the use of the concept of artistic value. Here I am concerned to defend current practice against Lopes's attack. I argue that there is some unclarity as to what aspect (...) of this practice Lopes is objecting to, and I distinguish three kinds of objection that he could be read as making. I argue that none of these is adequately supported by Lopes's arguments, and that the corresponding three aspects of current philosophical practice are on firmer footing than Lopes's paper suggests. A new, plausible characterisation of artistic value will emerge from this discussion. (shrink)

According to strong representationalism it is in virtue of having a particular representational content that an experience has the specific phenomenal character that it has. This paper argues that representationalism does not have the resources to explain the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – it is bound to leave out the painfulness of pain or its negative affect. Its central argument proceeds by analysing the rationalising role of pains. According to it, representationalism is committed to a (...) false picture on which a subject who knowingly acts so as to get rid of her pain without thereby getting rid of the bodily condition it represents always behaves irrationally – in so acting she is shooting the messenger. Thus, there can be no viable representationalist account of the phenomenal character of pain. (shrink)

The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...) which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features. (shrink)

A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges from the chain as a whole. Nowhere however is it made clear what (...) exactly is meant by emergence. The aim of this paper is to fill that lacuna: we describe a detailed procedure for the emergence of justification that enables us to see exactly how justification surfaces from a chain of reasons. (shrink)

John Greco has recently raised two worries for epistemic contextualism, viz it deprives epistemology of its subject matter and renders objective knowledge impossible. He argues that these problems are not restricted to contextualism, but apply to rival theories, like subject sensitive invariantism, and that they are overstated. I develop Greco's worries, which show that contextualism suggests either that there is no such thing as knowledge, or a weird view of knowledge: as disparately varied and undisciplined, individual-dependent and arbitrary. I then (...) argue that these issues are not overstated and that they can be avoided if one opts for moderate insensitive invariantism. (shrink)

I defend extreme formalism about the aesthetics of inorganic nature. I outline the general issue over aesthetic formalism as it manifests itself in the visual arts. The main issue is over whether we need to know about the history of artworks in order to appreciate them aesthetically. I then turn to nature and concede that with organic nature we need to know a thing's biological kinds if we are fully to appreciate it. However, with in organic nature I deny that (...) we need to know the deeper nature of the things we experience. What is important, I argue, are the appearances of those things not their real natures. I consider the beauty of clouds, which depends on an illusion of solidity, and I argue that scientific knowledge does not reveal beauty that is not available to the ignoramous. There is only the beauty of appearances, and it does not matter whether those appearances are accurate or illusory. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quantification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has criticized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show that Linnebo’s objection rests on the assumption (...) of a notion of semantic value or contribution which both applies to expressions of any order, and picks out, for each expression, an extra-linguistic correlate of that expression. I go on to argue that higher-orderists can plausibly reject this assumption, by means of a hierarchy of notions they can use to describe the extra-lingustic correlates of expressions of different orders. (shrink)

While there is now considerable anxiety about whether the psychological theory presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically sustainable, analogous issues have received little attention in the virtue epistemology literature. This paper argues that virtue epistemology encounters challenges reminiscent of those recently encountered by virtue ethics: just as seemingly trivial variation in context provokes unsettling variation in patterns of moral behavior, trivial variation in context elicits unsettling variation in patterns of cognitive functioning. Insofar as reliability is a condition on epistemic virtue, (...) we have reason to doubt that human beings possess the cognitive materials required for epistemic virtue, and thereby reason to think that virtue epistemology is threatened by skepticism. We conclude that while virtue epistemology has resources for addressing this challenge, exploiting these resources forces tradeoffs between empirical and normative adequacy. (shrink)

The naïve view of temporal experience (Phillips, in: Lloyd D, Arstila V (eds) Subjective time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, forthcoming-a) comprises two claims. First, that we are perceptually aware of temporal properties, such as succession and change. Second, that for any temporal property apparently presented in experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property. In his paper ‘Silencing the experience of change’ (forthcoming), Watzl argues that this second naïve inheritance thesis faces a novel counter-example in the form (...) of the striking motion silencing effects recently demonstrated by Suchow and Alvarez (Curr Biol 21(2):140–143, 2011). Here I clarify the form which any counter-example to naïve inheritance must take. I then explain how, on a plausible, rival ‘crowding’ interpretation of Suchow and Alvarez’s data, motion silencing poses no more of a threat to naïve inheritance than standard cases of change blindness. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural (...) correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology. (shrink)

Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia (...) compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences. (shrink)

History and literature provide striking examples of people who are morally admirable, in part, because of their profound faith in people’s decency. But moral philosophers have largely ignored this trait, and I suspect that many philosophers would view such faith with suspicion, dismissing it as a form of naïvete or as some other objectionable form of irrationality. I argue that such suspicion is misplaced, and that having a certain kind of faith in people’s decency, which I call faith in humanity, (...) is a centrally important moral virtue. In order to make this view intuitively more plausible, I discuss two moral exemplars – one historical and the other literary – whose lives vividly exhibit such faith. Then I provide a rationale for the view that having such faith is morally admirable. Finally, I discuss cases in which someone’s faith in humanity can lead her to make judgments that are, to some degree, epistemically irrational. I argue that the existence of such cases does not pose a serious objection to the view that having faith in humanity is a moral virtue. Rather, it makes salient important limits on the role that epistemic, as opposed to practical, rationality should occupy in our ideals of how to live. (shrink)

Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on intuitions in epistemology. In a recent paper, Jennifer Nagel offers a pair of arguments aimed at showing that epistemic intuitions do not, in fact, vary in problematic ways. One of these arguments relies on a number of claims defended by appeal to the psychological literature on (...) intuitive judgment and on mental state attribution (also known as “theory of mind”, “mindreading” and “folk psychology”). I call this the "theoretical argument". The other argument relies on recent experimental work carried out by Nagel and her collaborators. It is my contention that in setting out her theoretical argument, Nagel offers an account of the relevant scientific literature that is, in crucial respects, flawed and misleading. My main goal in this paper is to rectify these errors and to make it clear that, once this is done, Nagel’s theoretical argument collapses. Since Nagel’s experimental work has not yet been published, and available details are very sketchy, I do not discuss this work in detail. However, in the final section of the paper I offer some critical observations about Nagel’s strategy for dealing with empirical data that does not support her view – both other people’s and her own. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept of essence (...) involved. I argue that the traditional modal theory of essence meets these desiderata, but that the resulting theory wrongly implies that certain dispositions essential to mass are essential to charge, thereby offering a new argument against modal theories of essence. I argue that dispositional essentialism requires a primitive notion of essence, and develop a primitivist theory based on Kit Fine's views. I show that the primitivist theory has all the virtues of the modal alternative, and none of the vices. I develop a novel way of thinking about the relationship between properties, laws and dispositions, and argue that it has distinct advantages over standard dispositional essentialist formulations. (shrink)

This article considers the traditional Islamic narrative in the light of the theory of religion espoused by John Hick (1922–2012). We see how the Islamic narrative changes on a Hickean understanding of religion, particularly in the light of the ‘bottom-up’ approach and trans-personal conception of the religious ultimate that it espouses. Where the two readings of Islam appear to conflict, I suggest how they can be reconciled. I argue that if Hick’s theory is incompatible with Islamic belief, then this incompatibility (...) does not manifest itself at the level of belief in the narrative. (shrink)

Philo's argument from evil in a much-discussed passage in Part X of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) has been interpreted in three main ways: as a logical argument from evil, as an evidential argument from evil, and as an argument against natural theology's inference of a benevolent and merciful God from the course of the world. I argue that Philo is not offering an argument of any of these sorts, but is arguing that there is a radical disanalogy between (...) the meanings of terms like ‘merciful’ and ‘benevolent’ when applied to God and human beings respectively. Drawing on the new ‘Irreligious Interpretation’ of Hume's philosophy developed by Paul Russell (2002, 2008), I suggest that the underlying aim of Philo's argument appears to be to show, in opposition to Christian teaching, that these terms, when applied to God, are in effect meaningless. (shrink)

In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a (...) formalization of the logic of “ $S$ S is informed that $p$ p ” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “ $S$ S is informed that $p$ p ” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “ $S$ S is informed that $p$ p ”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned. (shrink)

In this paper I argue in favor of a new definition of presentism that I call ‘existence presentism’ (EP). Typically, presentism is defined as the thesis that ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘nothing exists that is non-present’. I assume these statements to be equivalent. I call these statements of presentism ‘conventional presentism’ (CP). The first half of the paper is constituted by a negative project that looks to show how extant definitions of presentism fail. In the second half of the (...) paper, I continue in the negative theme before laying out EP and demonstrating that it solves the problems faced by CP and offering explanations of how to make sense of certain key notions that lie at the heart of EP. I conclude that EP is preferable to CP. (shrink)

Given his representationalism how can Locke claim we have sensitive knowledge of the external world? We can see the skeptic as asking two different questions: how we can know the existence of external things, or more specifically how we can know inferentially of the existence of external things. Locke's account of sensitive knowledge, a form of non-inferential knowledge, answers the first question. All we can achieve by inference is highly probable judgment. Because Locke's theory of knowledge includes both first order (...) psychological and second order normative conditions, sensitive knowledge can be non-inferential and less certain than intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. (shrink)

Any philosopher who defends Free Will should have an answer to the epistemological question: “how do we know that we have such a capacity?” A traditional answer to this question is that we have some form of introspective access to our own Free Will. In recent times though, many philosophers have considered any such introspectionist theory as so obviously wrong that it hardly needs discussion, especially when Free Will is understood in libertarian terms. One of the rare objections to appear (...) as an explicit argument was proposed by van Inwagen in his Essay on Free Will. In this paper, I address van Inwagen’s anti-introspection argument; I argue that it is both inconsistent with his overall treatment of the Existence Question (namely, with his defence of the existence of Free Will from reflections about morality), and inconclusive in itself (at least for anyone not ready to endorse general scepticism about perception). In passing, I give a clarification of the notion of Introspection, in the case of Freedom, that also sets a more favourable stage for the evaluation of further objections. (shrink)

Various PtIV diazides have been investigated over the years as light-activatable prodrugs that interfere with cell proliferation, accumulate in cancer cells and cause cell death. The potencies of the complexes vary depending on the substituted amines (pyridine=piperidine>ammine) as well as the coordination geometry (trans diazide>cis). Light-activated PtIV diazides tend to be less specific than cisplatin at inhibiting cancer cell growth, but cells resistant to cisplatin show little cross-resistance to PtIV diazides. Platinum is accumulated in the cancer cells to a similar (...) level as cisplatin, but only when activated by light, indicating that reactive Pt species form photolytically. Studies show that Pt also becomes attached to cellular DNA upon the light activation of various PtIV diazides. Structures of some of the photolysis products were elucidated by LC–MS/MS; monoaqua- and diaqua-PtII complexes form that are reactive towards biomolecules such as calf thymus DNA. Platination of calf thymus DNA can be blocked by the addition of nucleophiles such as glutathione and chloride, further evidence that aqua-PtII species form upon irradiation. Evidence is presented that reactive oxygen species may be generated in the first hours following photoactivation. Cell death does not take the usual apoptotic pathways seen with cisplatin, but appears to involve autophagy. Thus, photoactivated diazido-PtIV complexes represent an interesting class of potential anti-cancer agents that can be selectively activated by light and kill cells by a mechanism different to the anti-cancer drug cisplatin. (shrink)

Here, we recognize the growing significance of miniaturized devices as medical diagnostic tools and highlight the need to provide a convenient means of powering such instruments when implanted into the body. One of the most promising approaches to this end involves using a light-collection facility to absorb incident white light and transfer the photonic energy to a tiny semiconductor embedded on the device. Although fluorescent organic molecules offer strong potential as modules for such solar collectors, we emphasize the promise offered (...) by transition metal complexes. Thus, an extended series of binuclear Ru(II)/Os(II) poly(pyridine) complexes has been shown to be highly promising sensitizers for amorphous silicon solar cells. These materials absorb a high fraction of visible light while the Ru(II)-based units possess triplet energies that are comparable to those of the naphthalene-based bridge. The metal complex injects a triplet exciton into the bridge and this, in turn, is trapped by the Os(II)-based terminal. The result is extremely efficacious triplet-energy transfer; at room temperature the rate of energy transfer is independent of distance over some 6 nm and only weakly dependent on temperature. (shrink)

In the last decade, the use of time-resolved X-ray techniques has revealed the structure of light-generated transient species for a wide range of samples, from small organic molecules to proteins. Time resolutions of the order of 100 ps are typically reached, allowing one to monitor thermally equilibrated excited states and capture their structure as a function of time. This review aims at providing a general overview of the application of time-resolved X-ray solution scattering (TR-XSS) and time-resolved X-ray absorption spectroscopy (TR-XAS), (...) the two techniques prevalently employed in the investigation of light-triggered structural changes of transition metal complexes. In particular, we herein describe the fundamental physical principles for static XSS and XAS and illustrate the theory of time-resolved XSS and XAS together with data acquisition and analysis strategies. Selected pioneering examples of photoactive transition metal complexes studied by TR-XSS and TR-XAS are discussed in depth. (shrink)

Photodynamic therapy (PDT) is an evolving technique for localized control of diseased tissue with light after prior administration of a photosensitizing agent and in the presence of oxygen. The biological effect is quite different from surgery, radiotherapy and chemotherapy. With no temperature change during treatment, connective tissues like collagen are largely unaffected, so maintaining the mechanical integrity of hollow organs. PDT is of particular value for pre-cancer and early cancers of the skin (not melanomas) and mouth as the cosmetic and (...) functional results are so good. Another key indication is for small areas of cancer that are unsuitable for or have persisted or recurred after conventional management. It can be applied in areas already exposed to the maximum safe dose of radiotherapy. Outside cancer, in ophthalmology, it is established for age-related macular degeneration, and has considerable potential in arterial disease for preventing restenosis after balloon angioplasty and in the treatment of infectious diseases, where the responsible organisms are accessible to both the photosensitizer and light. New developments on the horizon include techniques for increasing the selectivity for cancers, such as coupling photosensitizers to antibodies, and for stimulating immunological responses, but many further pre-clinical and clinical studies are needed to establish PDT's role in routine clinical practice. (shrink)