CHAPTER I ANALYSIS OF THOUGHT § I. There is one dominating interest which runs through all the works of Husserl, from the earliest to the latest, ...

Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato's establishing of logic, as a place for exploring the essential requirements of "genuine" ...

This paper critiques Dagfinn Follesdal's influential interpretation of the Husserlian noema as a Fregean sense. Though other philosophers have argued that Follesdal's interpretation is mistaken, this paper demonstrates that the origin of the error is a fundamental misunderstanding, on Follesdal's part, of Husserlian terminology. The paper also examines the views of David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre who, influenced by Follesdal, mistakenly read the Husserl of the "Ideas" as a linguistically motivated philosopher. The paper concludes that, if Follesdal and his (...) followers were correct, certain methodological implications would follow for Husserlian phenomenology that would lead to its demise. (shrink)

I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universitat Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat's at tempt to bring together analytical and continental philosophy has never ceased to fascinate me, and even though in more recent years other influences have perhaps been stronger, I should like to look upon the present study as still being indebted to Tugendhat's initial incentive. It was my good fortune (...) that for personal reasons I had to con tinue my academic training from 1981 onwards in Finland. Even though Finland is a stronghold of analytical philosophy, it also has a tradition of combining continental and Anglosaxon philosophical thought. Since I had already admired this line of work in Tugendhat, it is hardly surprising that once in Finland I soon became impressed by Professor Jaakko Hintikka's studies on Husserl and intentionality, and by Professor Georg Henrik von Wright's analytical hermeneu tics. While the latter influence has-at least in part-led to a book on the history of hermeneutics, the former influence has led to the present work. My indebtedness to Professor Hintikka is enormous. Not only is the research reported here based on his suggestions, but Hintikka has also commented extensively on different versions of the manuscript, helped me to make important contacts, found a publisher for me, and-last but not least-was a never failing source of encouragement. (shrink)

Frege, G. Review of Dr. E. Husserl 's Philosophy of arithmetic.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege.-- Husserl, E. A Reply to a critic of my refutation of logical psychologism.--Willard, D. The Paradox of logical psychologism.--Natorp, P. On the question of logical method.--Næss, A. Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl 's thesis of the ideality of meanings.--Atwell, J. E. Husserl on signification and object.--Sokolowski, R. The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl 's Investigations.--Gurwitsch, A. Outlines (...) of a theory of essentially occasional expressions.--Bar-Hillel, Y. Husserl 's conception of a purely logical grammar.--Edie, J. M. Husserl 's conception of the grammatical and contemporary linguistics.--Downes, C. On Husserl 's approach to necessary truth.--Patzig, G. Husserl on truth and evidence.-- Husserl, E. The task and the significance of the Logical investigations. (shrink)

This essay situates itself on the ground of a very powerful but as yet unanswered critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and language proposed by Ernst Tugendhat. After suggesting the necessity of a dialogue between linguistic analysis and phenomenology, Tugendhat turns a critical eye toward Husserl. In the first section we reproduce his attack. Then in the second section we attempt to give a response to his critique from within the boundaries he has superimposed upon the discussion. In the third (...) and fourth sections, however, we attempt to enliven the problem by introducing several historical considerations which have been overlooked by Tugendhat and by taking the first steps toward reclaiming the productivity of language for genetic analysis. It is only when one makes this turn that Husserl’s notion of intentionality finds its solvency. (shrink)