Chisholm's ontological objective is the reductionist one of translating statements which appear to be about propositions and generic events into statements about states of affairs, denying the existence of concrete events altogether. The paper questions this program by criticising the notion of concretization on which Chisholm heavily relies. It is argued that there are no convincing arguments in favor of eliminative reductionism. Translability of statements about one kind of entity into statements about another kind of entity has nothing to do (...) with what exists. (shrink)

The common assumption that the Transcendental Deduction aims to refute scepticism often leads interpreters to conclude that it fails and even that Kant is confused about what it is supposed to achieve. By examining what Kant himself says concerning the Deductions' relation to scepticism, this article seeks to determine what sort of scepticism he has in view and how he responds to it. It concludes that the Deduction aims neither to refute Cartesian, outer- world scepticism nor to refute Humean, empiricist (...) scepticism, and it outlines an alternative conception of the Deduction's task, as one of reconciling apparently conflicting claims of reason. (shrink)