In Part I, I present two traditional arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with human freedom; the first of these is clearly fallacious; but the second, the argument from the necessity of the past, is much stronger. In the second section I explain and partly endorse Ockham’s response to the second argument: that only propositions strictly about the past are accidentally necessary, and past propositions about God’s knowledge of the future are not strictly about the past. In the third (...) part I point out some startling implications of Ockham’s way out; and finally in part IV I offer an account of accidental necessity according to which propositions about the past are accidentally necessary if and only if they are strictly about the past. (shrink)

Introduction: Two Working Assumptions In the course of the deliberations to follow, I assume that God (if He exists) is a being — a single individual ...

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

... or engenders a tradition of philosophical reflection, questions will arise about the relation between divine knowledge and power and human freedom. ...

Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.

This book discusses and exemplifies the philosophy of religion, or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion.

INTRODUCTION OCKHAM'S LIFE AND THE DATE OF THE TREATISE William Ockham, a highly influential philosopher of the fourteenth century and one of the most ...