Drawing on animal ethological studies, this article considers the possibility of a form of morality existing in animals and its relationship with human morality. Given this capacity, I argue that first we need to reflect more carefully on human sin and evil in evolutionary terms. Second, I question the adequacy of the traditional divide between “moral” and “natural” evil as well as consider the possibility of anthropogenic evil. Third, I suggest that a theological response to nonhuman morality should include discussion (...) of the atonement, but traditional categories prove inadequate. Fourth, drawing on Sergii Bulgakov, I explore the idea of shadow sophia as representing a multivocal theodicy that is capable of holding together a tapestry of different theological responses to evil. Finally, I discuss the redemption of nature in the light of the foregoing discussion. (shrink)

This short, readable book, aimed at a popular audience, is concerned to show that a naturalistic view of humankind can be reconciled with a commitment to morality and a belief in human freedom.

In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature , Steven Pinker maintains that at present there are three competing views of human nature—a Christian theory, a "blank slate" theory (what I call a social constructivist theory), and a Darwinian theory—and that the last of these will triumph in the end. I argue that neither the outcome of such competition nor the particular content of these theories is as clear as Pinker believes. In this essay I take a critical (...) as well as a constructive look at the challenge presented by a Darwinian theory of human nature—a challenge to the social sciences and the humanities and also to theology and more specifically to a Christian understanding of human nature. (shrink)

Theology and philosophy have traditionally assumed a radical split between human beings and the rest of creation. Philosophically, the split is usually justified in terms of a locus humanus, some one cognitive trait that human beings possess and nonhuman animals do not. Theologically, this trait is usually identified as that which makes us in the image of God. Research in animal cognition, however, suggests that we are not unique in as many respects as we think we are. This suggests that (...) we rethink the idea of the image of God. In light of this, I propose that we think of nature itself as being in the image of God, with humankind as part of the broader natural and theological process. (shrink)

Much ink has been spilled on the claim that morality and religion have evolutionary roots. While some attempt to reduce morality and religion to biological considerations, others reject any link whatsoever. Any full account, however, must acknowledge the biological roots of human behavior while at the same time recognizing that our relatively unique capacity as cognitive agents requires orienting concepts of cosmic and human nature. While other organisms display quasi‐moral and proto‐moral behavior that is indeed relevant, fully moral behavior is (...) only possible for organisms that attain a higher level of cognitive ability. This, in turn, implies a significant role for religion, which has traditionally provided an orientation within which moral conduct is understood. (shrink)

John Dupré explores the ways in which we categorize animals, including humans, and comes to refreshingly radical conclusions. He opposes the idea that there is only one legitimate way of classifying things in the natural world, the 'scientific' way. The lesson we should learn from Darwin is to reject the idea that each organism has an essence that determines its necessary place in the unique hierarchy of things. Nature is not like that: it is not organized in a single system. (...) For instance, there is no universal principle by which organisms can be sorted into species. We are obliged to accept that different classificatory schemes are equally valid, and to take a pluralistic view of biology and the human sciences. These provocative and readable essays move on to discuss a set of contentious topics relating to human nature. To start with, Dupré argues that the concept of a universal human nature should be rejected. He questions the relevance of evolution to explanation of human behaviour, and casts doubt on the concept of normality in human behaviour. He shows that misunderstanding of biology and evolution has lead to widespread misconceptions about human sex and gender-in particular, about sexual behaviour and gender roles. The books concludes with a pair of essays about the differences between humans and animals, which may not be quite so clear-cut as we think. (shrink)

In _The Ethical Primate_, Mary Midgley, 'one of the sharpest critical pens in the West' according to the _Times Literary Supplement_, addresses the fundamental question of human freedom. Scientists and philosophers have found it difficult to understand how each human-being can be a living part of the natural world and still be free. Midgley explores their responses to this seeming paradox and argues that our evolutionary origin explains both why and how human freedom and morality have come about.

Divided into three parts, this book's purpose, as given in the introduction, is to consider whether or not man is descended from a pre-existing form, his manner ...

Holmes Rolston challenges the sociobiological orthodoxy that would naturalize science, ethics, and religion. The book argues that genetic processes are not blind, selfish, and contingent, and that nature is therefore not value-free. The author examines the emergence of complex biodiversity through evolutionary history. Especially remarkable in this narrative is the genesis of human beings with their capacities for science, ethics, and religion. A major conceptual task of the book is to relate cultural genesis to natural genesis. There is also a (...) general account of how values are created and transmitted in both natural and human cultural history. The book is written by one of the most well-respected figures in the philosophy of biology and religion. (shrink)

This new translation of Thomas Aquinas’s most important study of Aristotle casts bright light on the thinking of both philosophers. Using a new text of Aquinas’s original Latin commentary, Robert Pasnau provides a precise translation that will enable students to undertake close philosophical readings. He includes an introduction and notes to set context and clarify difficult points as well as a translation of the medieval Latin version of Aristotle’s _De anima _ so that readers can refer to the text Aquinas (...) had at hand. In his _De anima commentary_, Aquinas offers the first and most original of his studies of Aristotle. His influential, cogent reading of Aristotle’s notoriously difficult text not only contributes to our understanding of the Greek philosopher but also expresses in full detail Aquinas’s own views on central philosophical topics. Writing at the height of his intellectual powers, Aquinas considers in full detail the nature of the soul, the mind-body problem, the role of the intellect, the character of sensation, and many other related issues. (shrink)

In over 200 separately-authored entries, this reference surveys both the historical and contemporary relations between religion and society. A selection of the world's leading scholars from varying disciplines and denominations cover all aspects of philosophy, theology, ethics, politics, economics and government, providing a brief definition of each term, a description of the principal ideas behind it, its history, development and contemporary relevance, and a detailed bibliography giving the major sources in the field. The Dictionary is prefaced by an introduction outlining (...) the scope and diversity of coverage. * Synthesizes theology, social thought, social philosophy and ethics * Prestigious editors and an international team of Consulting Editors * Selected entries include: AIDS, Domestic Violence, Madness, Prophecy, Terrorism, Women's Ordination, Fundamentalist Liberation Theology, Surrogacy. (shrink)

In The Ethical Primate , Mary Midgley, 'one of the sharpest critical pens in the West' according to the Times Literary Supplement , addresses the fundamental question of human freedom. Scientists and philosophers have found it difficult to understand how each human-being can be a living part of the natural world and still be free. Midgley explores their responses to this seeming paradox and argues that our evolutionary origin explains both why and how human freedom and morality have come about.

Holmes Rolston challenges the sociobiological orthodoxy that would naturalize science, ethics, and religion. The book argues that genetic processes are not blind, selfish, and contingent, and that nature is therefore not value-free. The author examines the emergence of complex biodiversity through evolutionary history. Especially remarkable in this narrative is the genesis of human beings with their capacities for science, ethics, and religion. A major conceptual task of the book is to relate cultural genesis to natural genesis. There is also a (...) general account of how values are created and transmitted in both natural and human cultural history. The book is thoroughly up-to-date on current biological thought and is written by one of the most well-respected figures in the philosophy of biology and religion. (shrink)

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Four principal papers and a total of 43 peer commentaries on the evolutionary origins of morality. To what extent is human morality the outcome of a continuous development from motives, emotions and social behaviour found in nonhuman animals? Jerome Kagan, Hans Kummer, Peter Railton and others discuss the first principal paper by primatologists Jessica Flack and Frans de Waal. The second paper, by cultural anthropologist Christopher Boehm, synthesizes social science and biological evidence to support his theory of how our hominid (...) ancestors became moral. In the third paper philosopher Elliott Sober and evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson argue that an evolutionary understanding of human nature allows sacrifice for others and ultimate desires for another's good. Finally Brian Skyrms argues that game theory based on adaptive dynamics must join the social scientist's use of rational choice and classical game theory to explain cooperation. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally concentrated on the qualities that make human beings different from other species. In _Beast and Man_ Mary Midgley, one of our foremost intellectuals, stresses continuities. What makes people tick? Largely, she asserts, the same things as animals. She tells us humans are rather more like other animals than we previously allowed ourselves to believe, and reminds us just how primitive we are in comparison to the sophistication of many animals. A veritable classic for our age, _Beast and (...) Man_ has helped change the way we think about ourselves and the world in which we live. (shrink)

While I admire the reviewed discoveries on the social techniques by which monkeys and apes cope with the conflicts within their communities, I am worried about some of the high-level interpretations given by the authors. In my view the processes reviewed are not ‘building blocks of morality’ but objects of human moral judgements. Their interpretation as ‘shared solutions’ is not supported by a demonstrated ability of nonhuman primates to identify their own acts with those of the other group members. There (...) is no evidence of a ‘concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions’ rather than individual learning of these solutions. The postulate of a ‘community concern’ implies a concept of community which is not supported by evidence. Applying terms coined for humans to other species is useful only if one eventually justifies it by appropriate experimentation. Possible methods are suggested. (shrink)

The behaviours Flack and de Waal describe as origins of human morality lack the most essential features of the human ethical competence; namely, application of the concepts good and bad to events, the capacities for guilt and empathy for another's state, and the ability to suppress actions that would compromise the self's virtue. These serious differences between apes and humans challenge the suggestion that primate behaviour lies on a continuum with human morality.

Flack and de Waal present evidence for behaviour in non-human primates that functions to share food, terminate fights and reconcile opponents. Consolation and punishment are also suggested. These functions are assumed to be the motivation for the behaviour. Animals indeed have expectations about signal meaning and the likely immediate consequences of their behaviour. This does not mean they understand genetic fitness, peacekeeping or justice, even if these functions are achieved. Instrumental aggression is used to achieve a goal, not to punish (...) wrong doers. More elaborate motivation would indeed require empathy, sympathy, community solutions and morality. Although more parsimonious explanations for the behaviour described are rejected as not necessarily being true, less parsimonious explanations are not necessarily true either, no matter how appealing. (shrink)

With an interest in origins, it is proposed that conflict within the group can be taken as a natural focus for exploring the evolutionary development of human moral communities. Morality today involves social control but also the management of conflicts within the group. It is hypothesized that early manifestations of morality involved the identification and collective suppression of behaviours likely to cause such conflict. By triangulation the mutual ancestor of humans and the two Pan species lived in pronounced social dominance (...) hierarchies, and made largely individualized efforts to damp conflict within the group, exhibiting consolation, reconciliation, and active pacifying intervention behaviour. It is particularly the active interventions that can be linked with social control as we know it. It is proposed that when this process became collectivized, and when language permitted the definition and tracking of proscribed behaviour, full-blown morality was on its way. Because early humans lived in egalitarian bands, a likely candidate for the first behaviour to be labelled as morally deviant is not the incest taboo but bullying behaviour, of the type that egalitarian humans today universally proscribe and suppress. (shrink)

Boehm reasons that human morality began when several heads of households formed a coalition to limit the despotic bullying of an alpha male. The logic is clear and the argument is persuasive. The premises require that: dominant individuals behave like chimpanzees, bullying their subordinates, early humans somehow developed one-male units from a chimpanzee like society and, the power of a despot is limited by group consensus and political activities. Not all alpha males behave like chimpanzees; most primate societies show little (...) evidence of bullying. One-male units are formed by some monkeys but there is little evidence of such tendencies in chimpanzees and bonobos. Hamadryas males do not compete with familiar males for females or possessions regardless of their dominance relationships, but this inhibition is not based on group consensus or coalitions repressing alpha males. Boehm's argument is, nonetheless, possible and plausible but cannot be empirically tested. (shrink)

Christopher Boehm proposes that morality began when a society of hunter-gatherers punished a member for violating its rules. He claims social control of this kind is universal, and that apes have related tendencies. Emile Durkheim had a similar conception of social control in the simplest and earliest societies. But both are wrong: Hunter-gatherers rarely, if ever, handle conflict in a law-like and penal fashion, and the society as a whole rarely if ever is the agent of social control. Individuals typically (...) handle their own conflicts, and avoidance is more common than punishment. Pure sociology predicts and explains the handling of conflict with its location and direction in social space -- its social structure. The nature of morality depends, for example, on the social distance and degree of inequality between the parties, whether humans or nonhumans. Morality varies from case to case. It is relative rather than universal. Boehm therefore describes the origin of something that has never existed. All that is universal are the principles of structural relativity. (shrink)

Response to Commentary Discussion on ‘Any Animal Whatever. Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes.’.

Editorial Introduction to ‘Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives’. The four principal papers presented here, with interdisciplinary commentary discussion and their authors’ responses, represent contemporary approaches to an evolutionary understanding of morality -- of the origins from which, and the paths by which, aspects or components of human morality evolved and converged. Their authors come out of no single discipline or school, but represent rather a convergence of largely independent work in primate ethology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and dynamic systems modelling (...) on related problems, conjectures and tentative conclusions. In inviting contributions I deliberately made no attempt to define morality more sharply than common language and understanding have left it, including our ordinary responses to right and wrong, but not all of the very diverse thinking about this and other practical concerns -- and about what we should make of all these -- that ethics encompasses. This was not because of any lack of past definitions of morality, but because the history of controversy over these makes it advisable not to prejudge the question pending our inquiry's results. From these we may see some outlines of plausible answers begin to emerge, only a brief sketch of some of which I can attempt here, sampling the hypotheses, scientific support, critical discussion of this, and refinement of positions in authors’ responses. (shrink)