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  1. The subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism.Tom Stoneham - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.
  • The problem of free mass: Must properties cluster?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):125–138.
    Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata, while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. Virtually all plausible ontologies turn out to be committed to the existence of free masses.
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  • The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):125-138.
    Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata, while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. Virtually all plausible ontologies turn out to be committed to the existence of free masses. I develop and defend the view that the (...)
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  • There might be nothing: The subtraction argument improved.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159–166.
  • There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159-166.
  • Why the subtraction argument does not add up.A. Paseau - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):73-75.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) has refined an argument due to Thomas Baldwin (1996), which claims to prove nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, and which apparently does so without reliance on any heavy-duty metaphysics of modality. This note will show that on either reading of its key premiss, the subtraction argument Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes is invalid. [A sequel to this paper, 'The Subtraction Argument(s)', was published in Dialectica in 2006.].
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  • The subtraction argument(s).Alexander Paseau - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):145–156.
    The subtraction argument aims to show that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. The argument has been endorsed by several philosophers. I show that there are currently two versions of the argument around, and that only one of them is valid. I then sketch the main problem for the valid version of the argument.
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  • Speaking of everything.Richard L. Cartwright - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):1-20.
  • There might be nothing.Thomas Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231–238.
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  • There might be nothing.T. Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231-238.
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