In the last few years, there has been an enormous amount of activity in the study of analogy and metaphor. This is partly because of an interest of artificial intelligence researchers in simulating learning processes using analogy. It also arises from critical examinations of standard theories in the philosophy of language, with their inbuilt literal/meta phoric distinction. This volume consists of recent previously unpub lished work in this area, with a particular emphasis upon the role of analogies in reasoning and, (...) more generally, their role in thought and language. The papers are contributed by philosophers, computer scientists, cognitive scientists and literary critics. Researchers in these fields whose focus is the study of analogy and metaphor will find much of interest in this volume. These essays can also serve as an introduction to some of the major approaches taken in the investigation of analogy. As noted, this volume brings together the work of researchers in several different disciplines. The various approaches taken with respect to the understanding of analogy tend to be rather different, however, the articles suggest a common conclusion. Analogy and metaphor pervade thought and language; their close investigation thus constitutes a valuable contribution to our understanding of persons. DAVID H. HELMAN Case Western Reserve University vii PART I CONCEPTUAL AND CATEGORICAL THEORIES OF ANALOGICAL UNDERSTANDING MARK TURNER CATEGORIES AND ANALOGIES I want to pursue the following claims: The way we categorize helps explain the way we recognize a statement as an analogy. (shrink)

In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.

3 in philosophy, and therefore in metaphilosophy, cannot be based on rules that avoid spending time on pseudo-problems. Of course, this implies that, if one succeeds in demonstrating convincingly the pseudo-character of a problem by giving its 'solution', the time spent on it need not be seen as wasted. We conclude this section with a brief statement of the criteria for concept explication as they have been formulated in several places by Carnap, Hempel and Stegmiiller. Hempel's account is still very (...) adequate for a detailed introduction. The process of explication starts with the identification of one or more vague and, perhaps, ambiguous concepts, the so-called explicanda. Next, one tries to disentangle the ambiguities. This, however, need not be possible at once. Ultimately the explicanda are to be replaced by certain counterparts, the so-called explicata, which have to conform to four requirements. They have to be as precise as possible and as simple as possible. In addition, they have to be useful in the sense that they give rise to the formulation of theories and the solution of problems. The three requirements of preciseness, simplicity and usefulness. have of course to be pursued in all concept formation. (shrink)

According to the Bayesian view, scientific hypotheses must be appraised in terms of their posterior probabilities relative to the available experimental data. Such posterior probabilities are derived from the prior probabilities of the hypotheses by applying Bayes'theorem. One of the most important problems arising within the Bayesian approach to scientific methodology is the choice of prior probabilities. Here this problem is considered in detail w.r.t. two applications of the Bayesian approach: (1) the theory of inductive probabilities (TIP) developed by Rudolf (...) Carnap and other epistomologists and (2) the analysis of the multinational inferences provided by Bayesian statstics (BS). ... Zie: Summary. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown that there is a natural way of dealing with analogy by similarity in inductive systems by extending intuitive ways of introduction of systems without analogy. This procedure leads to Carnap-like systems, with zero probability for contingent generalizations, satisfying a general principle of so-called virtual analogy. This new principle is different from, but compatible with, Carnap's principle. It will be shown that the latter principle is satisfied, and should only be satisfied, if the underlying distance (...) function is such that all predicates have the same "predicate-environment". Finally, the claim that the new systems have the property of order indifference only with respect to the past will be defended. (shrink)