A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models (...) and neural models. The explanations of behavior provided are like those traditional in the physical sciences, unlike the explanations provided by symbolic models. (shrink)

Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve (...) complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization. (shrink)

Understanding novel phrases (e.g. upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories (...) can combine, some of them lose their force when applied to a suitable dual model. (shrink)

A comprehensive formal system is developed that amalgamates the operational and the realistic approaches to quantum mechanics. In this formalism, for example, a sharp distinction is made between events, operational propositions, and the properties of physical systems.

We show that Bell inequalities can be violated in the macroscopic world. The macroworld violation is illustrated using an example involving connected vessels of water. We show that whether the violation of inequalities occurs in the microworld or the macroworld, it is the identification of nonidentical events that plays a crucial role. Specifically, we prove that if nonidentical events are consistently differentiated, Bell-type Pitowsky inequalities are no longer violated, even for Bohm's example of two entangled spin 1/2 quantum particles. We (...) show how Bell inequalities can be violated in cognition, specifically in the relationship between abstract concepts and specific instances of these concepts. This supports the hypothesis that genuine quantum structure exists in the mind. We introduce a model where the amount of nonlocality and the degree of quantum uncertainty are parameterized, and demonstrate that increasing nonlocality increases the degree of violation, while increasing quantum uncertainty decreases the degree of violation. (shrink)

The quantum logical `or' is analyzed from a physical perspective. We show that it is the existence of EPR-like correlation states for the quantum mechanical entity under consideration that make it nonequivalent to the classical situation. Specifically, the presence of potentiality in these correlation states gives rise to the quantum deviation from the classical logical `or'. We show how this arises not only in the microworld, but also in macroscopic situations where EPR-like correlation states are present. We investigate how application (...) of this analysis to concepts could alleviate some well known problems in cognitive science. (shrink)

We present a model that allows one to build structures that evolve continuously from classical to quantum, and we study the intermediate situations, giving rise to structures that are neither classical nor quantum. We construct the closure structure corresponding to the collection of eigenstate sets of these intermediate situations, and demonstrate how the superposition principle disappears during the transition from quantum to classical. We investigate the validity of the axioms of quantum mechanics for the intermediate situations.

Creativity is one of the least understood aspects of intelligence and is often seen as intuitive' and not susceptible to rational enquiry. Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the area, principally in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, but also in psychology, philosophy, computer science, logic, mathematics, sociology, and architecture and design. This volume brings this work together and provides an overview of this rapidly developing field. It addresses a range of issues. Can computers be creative? Can (...) they help us to understand human creativity? How can artificial intelligence (AI) enhance human creativity? How, in particular, can it contribute to the sciences of the artificial', such as design? Does the new wave of AI (connectionism, geneticism and artificial life) offer more promise in these areas than classical, symbol-handling AI? What would the implications be for AI and cognitive science if computers could not be creative? These issues are explored in five interrelated parts, each of which is introducted and explained by a leading figure in the field. - Prologue (Margaret Boden) - Part I: Foundational Issues (Terry Dartnall) - Part II: Creativity and Cognition (Graeme S. Halford and Robert Levinson) - Part III: Creativity and Connectionism (Chris Thornton) - Part IV: Creativity and Design (John Gero) - Part V: Human Creativity Enhancement (Ernest Edmonds) - Epilogue (Douglas Hofstadter) For researchers in AI, cognitive science, computer science, philosophy, psychology, mathematics, logic, sociology, and architecture and design; and anyone interested in the rapidly growing field of artificial intelligence and creativity. (shrink)

How is it possible to think new thoughts? What is creativity and can science explain it? And just how did Coleridge dream up the creatures of The Ancient Mariner? When The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms was first published, Margaret A. Boden's bold and provocative exploration of creativity broke new ground. Boden uses examples such as jazz improvisation, chess, story writing, physics, and the music of Mozart, together with computing models from the field of artificial intelligence to uncover the nature (...) of human creativity in the arts. The second edition of The Creative Mind has been updated to include recent developments in artificial intelligence, with a new preface, introduction and conclusion by the author. It is an essential work for anyone interested in the creativity of the human mind. (shrink)

This volume argues in favor of rethinking basic issues in cognitive science in the context of recent developments.

This paper presents a speculative model of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the transition from episodic to mimetic (or memetic) culture with the arrival of Homo erectus, which Donald [1991] claims paved the way for the unique features of human culture. The model draws on Kauffman's [1993] theory of how an information-evolving system emerges through the formation of an autocatalytic network. Though originally formulated to explain the origin of life, this theory also provides a plausible account of how discrete episodic memories (...) become woven into an internal model of the world, or worldview, that both structures, and is structured by, self-triggered streams of thought. Social interaction plays a role in (and may be critical to) this process. Implications for cognitive development are explored. (shrink)

Our knowledge of natural categories includes beliefs not only about what is true of them but also about what would be true if the categories had properties other than (or in addition to) their actual ones. Evidence about these beliefs comes from three lines of research: experiments on category-based induction, on hypothetical transformations of category members, and on definitions of kind terms. The 1st part of this article examines results and theories arising from each of these research streams. The 2nd (...) part considers possible unified theories for this domain, including theories based on ideals and norms. It also contrasts 2 broad frameworks for modal category information: one focusing on beliefs about intrinsic or essential properties, the other focusing on interacting causal relations. (shrink)

A stream of conscious experience is extremely contextual; it is impacted by sensory stimuli, drives and emotions, and the web of associations that link, directly or indirectly, the subject of experience to other elements of the individual's worldview. The contextuality of one's conscious experience both enhances and constrains the contextuality of one's behavior. Since we cannot know first-hand the conscious experience of another, it is by way of behavioral contextuality that we make judgements about whether or not, and to what (...) extent, a system is conscious. Thus we believe that a deep understanding of contextuality is vital to the study of consciousness. Methods have been developed for handling contextuality in the microworld of quantum particles. Our goal has been to investigate the extent to which these methods can be used to analyze contextuality in conscious experience. (shrink)

It is perhaps not so baffling that we have the ability to develop, refine, and manifest a creative idea, once it has been conceived. But what sort of a system could spawn the initial seed of creativity from which an idea grows? This paper looks at how the mind is structured in such a way that we can experience a glimmer of insight or inkling of artistic inspiration.

Six experiments explored the hypothesis that the members of categories which are considered most prototypical are those with most attributes in common with other members of the category and least attributes in common with other categories. In probabilistic terms, the hypothesis is that prototypicality is a function of the total cue validity of the attributes of items. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects listed attributes for members of semantic categories which had been previously rated for degree of prototypicality. High positive (...) correlations were obtained between those ratings and the extent of distribution of an item's attributes among the other items of the category. In Experiments 2 and 4, subjects listed superordinates of category members and listed attributes of members of contrasting categories. Negative correlations were obtained between prototypicality and superordinates other than the category in question and between prototypicality and an item's possession of attributes possessed by members of contrasting categories. Experiments 5 and 6 used artificial categories and showed that family resemblance within categories and lack of overlap of elements with contrasting categories were correlated with ease of learning, reaction time in identifying an item after learning, and rating of prototypicality of an item. It is argued that family resemblance offers an alternative to criterial features in defining categories. (shrink)

The story is told of a physicist who is invited by a dairy farmers’ association to tell them how to get more milk from cows. The physicist begins: ‘First we start with a spherical cow.’ That is told as a joke! Yet far more strange is what cognitivism has done to what is supposed to be the study of human thought and human life. This chapter is about concepts, the central building blocks of cognitivist theory. I will first show how (...) cognitivism necessarily cannot give an adequate treatment of concepts and will then, more importantly , outline the foundations for a new nonrepresentational view of concepts which should place the study of concepts on a real basis. (shrink)