- Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives.P. Kyle Stanford - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Abductive knowledge and Holmesian inference.Alexander Bird - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--31.details
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Scientific realism, the atomic theory, and the catch-all hypothesis: Can we test fundamental theories against all serious alternatives?P. Kyle Stanford - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):253-269.details
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Refusing the devil's bargain: What kind of underdetermination should we take seriously?P. Kyle Stanford - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S1-.details
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Refusing the Devil’s bargain: What kind of underdetermination should we take seriously?P. Kyle Stanford - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S1-S12.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, exceeding our grasp.Kyle Stanford - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.details
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What’s New about the New Induction?P. D. Magnus - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):295-301.details
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Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.details
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VI*—Is the Best Good Enough?Peter Lipton - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):89-104.details
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Tracking Track Records.Peter Lipton & John Worrall - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:179-235.details
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Tracking Track Records.Peter Lipton & John Worrall - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:179-235.details
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Inference to the Only Explanation.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):424-432.details
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Why the pessimistic induction is a fallacy.Peter J. Lewis - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):371--380.details
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Why The Pessimistic Induction Is A Fallacy.Peter J. Lewis - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):371-380.details
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Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy.M. Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281-285.details
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Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy.Marc Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281–285.details
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Introduction: French philosophy and science.Douglas Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Forum 37 (1):1–2.details
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The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific knowledge.Philip Kitcher - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--408.details
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P. Kyle Stanford exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives.Patrick Enfield - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):881-895.details
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What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived.Anjan Chakravartty - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):149-158.details
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Preservative realism and its discontents: Revisiting caloric.Hasok Chang - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):902-912.details
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What is scientific progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.details
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Lex orandi ast Lex credendi.Richard N. Boyd - 1985 - In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press.details
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Rationality and objectivity in science or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes.Wesley Salmon - 1990 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 14--175.details
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.Stathos Psillos - unknowndetails
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Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method.Richard Boyd - 1983 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 355-391.details
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Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference.Alexander Bird - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.details
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