Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

The foundation of the Institute of Philosophy coincided with my own entry into the ranks of academic philosophers. It may therefore on this special occasion be of some interest if I cast some retrospective glances at philosophy's daily life in and after the middle 1920s. I shall not steal from the proper hands the task of sketching the history of the Royal Institute itself; but I have some now fairly rare qualifications for describing the philosophical world into which it was (...) born. (shrink)

The article proposes a comparison between the critique that Antoine Arnault (1612-1694) raises against Malebranche’s views on perception and the critique that Thomas Reid (1710-1796) moves against the theory of ideas defended by Berkeley and Hume. Both Arnault and Reid advocate a position according to which our perceptions allow us to have direct knowledge of material objects existing independently of us and not only of representations of them. Arnault proposes different arguments to refute Malebranche. In doing that he doesn’t completely (...) reject the Cartesian representational account of perception. Reid is more radical: in order to refuse Berkeley and Hume he rejects the whole theory of ideas, and focuses instead on the mental powers through which we cognize reality. (shrink)