While most of the books and articles written about Adorno’s negative dialectic acknowledge its debt to both Kant and Hegel it is noticeable that they usually attribute to it a Hegelian core. Unfortunately, this by now standard approach has given rise to two problems. First, it has, almost carefully, avoided the exigetically more demanding task of establishing Adorno’s professed appropriation of Kant’s theory of mind and knowledge. Secondly, and as a consequence, the standard approach has discouraged any appreciation of what (...) I believe to be the thoroughgoingly epistemological nature of Adorno’s negative dialectic. In exploring Adorno’s epistemology in this article, I intend to both correct this trend in Adorno interpretation and, at the same time, to introduce Adorno into current epistemological debates. This will amount to an attempt to explain and justify Adorno’s statement that subject and object “constitute one another as much as—by virtue of such constitution—they depart from each other” [ND 176 ]. In doing this I propose to follow Adorno’s central thesis of mediation, as far as possible, from a Kantian rather than Hegelian perspective. (shrink)

Martin Jay has provided a substantial new preface for this edition, in which he reflects on the continuing relevance of the work of the Frankfurt School.

Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Franz Neumann, Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal—the impact of the Frankfurt School on the sociological, political, and cultural thought of the twentieth century has been profound. _The Dialectical Imagination_ is a major history of this monumental cultural and intellectual enterprise during its early years in Germany and in the United States. Martin Jay has provided a substantial new preface for this edition, in which he reflects on the continuing relevance of the work of the Frankfurt (...) School. (shrink)

Allow me to preface my remarks today by saying that I am not going to give a lecture in the usual sense of communicating results or presenting a systematic statement. Rather, what I have to say will remain on the level of an essay; it is no more than an attempt to take up and further develop the problems of the so-called Frankfurt discussion. I recognize that many uncomplimentary things have been said about this discussion, but I am equally aware (...) that it approaches the problem correctly and that it would be wrong always to begin again at the beginning. (shrink)

A major and brilliant work of Marxist theory, admirably rigorous, clear-minded and well-researched.

Hegel's philosophy has often been compared to a circle of circles: an ascending spiral to its admirers, but a vortex to its critics. The metaphor reflects Hegel's claim to offer a conception of philosophical reason so comprehensive as to include all others as partial forms of itself. It is a claim which faces the writer on Hegel with peculiar difficulties. Criticism, it would appear, can always be outflanked; criticism of the system can be turned back into criticism within the system. (...) Michael Rosen discusses the philosophical issues involved in historical interpretation before presenting a novel and challenging solution to the problem of Hegel's openness to criticism. Contrary to received opinion, Hegel's philosophy does not, he argues, draw upon a universal and pre-suppositionless conception of rationality. Rather, Hegel's originality lies in founding his system upon a particular, avowedly mystical conception of philosophical experience. This experience - Hegel calls it 'pure Thought' - is fundamental. Pure Thought makes speculative reasoning intelligible and, hence, underpins the claim to rationality of the entire system. Dr Rosen's conclusion is that all attempts at rehabilitation of Hegel are based on misunderstanding. When restored to their speculative-mystical shell the irrational kernel of Hegel's concepts becomes apparent. (shrink)