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  1. The consistency of the axiom of comprehension in the infinite-valued predicate logic of łukasiewicz.Richard B. White - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):509 - 534.
  • Light affine set theory: A naive set theory of polynomial time.Kazushige Terui - 2004 - Studia Logica 77 (1):9 - 40.
    In [7], a naive set theory is introduced based on a polynomial time logical system, Light Linear Logic (LLL). Although it is reasonably claimed that the set theory inherits the intrinsically polytime character from the underlying logic LLL, the discussion there is largely informal, and a formal justification of the claim is not provided sufficiently. Moreover, the syntax is quite complicated in that it is based on a non-traditional hybrid sequent calculus which is required for formulating LLL.In this paper, we (...)
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  • Logical paradoxes for many-valued systems.Moh Shaw-Kwei - 1954 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):37-40.
  • Naïve comprehension and contracting implications.Susan Rogerson & Sam Butchart - 2002 - Studia Logica 71 (1):119-132.
    In his paper [6], Greg Restall conjectured that a logic supports a naïve comprehension scheme if and only if it is robustly contraction free, that is, if and only if no contracting connective is definable in terms of the primitive connectives of the logic. In this paper, we present infinitely many counterexamples to Restall''s conjecture, in the form of purely implicational logics which are robustly contraction free, but which trivialize naïve comprehension.
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  • Extending intuitionistic linear logic with knotted structural rules.R. Hori, H. Ono & H. Schellinx - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (2):219-242.
  • How to be R eally Contraction-Free.Greg Restall - 1993 - Studia Logica 52 (3):381 - 391.
    A logic is said to be contraction free if the rule from A→(A→B) to A→B is not truth preserving. It is well known that a logic has to be contraction free for it to support a non-trivial naïve theory of sets or of truth. What is not so well known is that if there is another contracting implication expressible in the language, the logic still cannot support such a naïve theory. A logic is said to be robustly contraction free if (...)
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  • Curry’s Paradox.Robert K. Meyer, Richard Routley & J. Michael Dunn - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):124 - 128.
  • Curry's paradox.Robert K. Meyer & Alonso Church - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):124-128.
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  • The combinatory foundations of mathematical logic.Haskell B. Curry - 1942 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):49-64.