THE PAPER BEGINS BY CONSIDERING THREE ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "ANALYTIC," ONE IN TERMS OF LOGICAL TRUTH, ONE IN TERMS OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS, AND ONE IN TERMS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION OR INCOHERENCE. NEXT, FIVE DEFINITIONS OF "NECESSARY" ARE CONSIDERED, ONE IN TERMS OF ANALYTICITY, AND ONE PICKING OUT THE BROADER KIND OF LOGICAL NECESSITY DISCUSSED BY KRIPKE AND PLANTINGA. FINALLY, THREE DEFINITIONS OF "A PRIORI" ARE CONSIDERED. ONLY ON A FEW OF THESE DEFINITIONS DO THE CATEGORIES OF ANALYTIC, NECESSARY, AND (...) A PRIORI COINCIDE. (shrink)

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

This new edition keeps the same successful format, with each chapter providing a self-contained introduction to the topic it discusses, rewritten to include ...

Indian logic is mainly devoted to the study of nyaya the logical structure of which is analogous to that of a categorical syllogism. In a nyaya it is inferred that since the probans (similar to the middle term) is pervaded by or never exists without the probandum (similar to the major term) and since the probans belongs to the inferential subject (similar to the minor term), the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. Many modern scholars hold that in early Indian (...) logic a nyaya was an analogical argument from particular to particular. We disagree. Early Nyaya works say explicitly that what deviates is a pseudo-probans; this implies that a probans is non-deviant or pervaded by the probandum and thus that a universal premise stating the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is needed. Such a universal premise is also found in articulated arguments. Further, a counterargument based on mere analogy to a nyaya based on a universal connection is viewed as a pseudo-refutation. (shrink)

Indian logic is mainly devoted to the study of nyaya the logical structure of which is analogous to that of a categorical syllogism. In a nyaya it is inferred that since the probans (similar to the middle term) is pervaded by or never exists without the probandum (similar to the major term) and since the probans belongs to the inferential subject (similar to the minor term), the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. Many modern scholars hold that in early Indian (...) logic a nyaya was an analogical argument from particular to particular. We disagree. Early Nyaya works say explicitly that what deviates is a pseudo-probans; this implies that a probans is non-deviant or pervaded by the probandum and thus that a universal premise stating the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is needed. Such a universal premise is also found in articulated arguments. Further, a counterargument based on mere analogy to a nyaya based on a universal connection is viewed as a pseudo-refutation. (shrink)

This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and (...) sceptical view deriving from Hume that laws assert no more than a regularity of coincidence between instances of properties. In doing so he presents what may become the definitive statement of the case against this position. Professor Armstrong then goes on to establish his own theory in a systematic manner defending it against the most likely objections, and extending both it and the related theory of universals to cover functional and statistical laws. This treatment of the subject is refreshingly concise and vivid: it will both stimulate vigorous professional debate and make an excellent student text. (shrink)

The word 'philosophy' as well as the conjuring expression 'Indian philosophy' has meant different things to different people-endeavours and activities, old and new, grave and frivolous, edifying and banal, esoteric and exoteric. In this book, the author has chosen deliberately a very dominant trend of the classical (Sanskrit) philosophical literature as his subject of study. The age of the material used here demands both philological scholarship and philosophical amplification. Classical pramanasastras usually deal with the theory of knowledge, the nature of (...) inference and language, and the related questions of ontology and semantics. Several important concepts and theories have been singled out for critical analysis and clarification in modern terms so that the results may be intelligible to modern students of both Sanskrit and philosophy. It is hoped that such an attempt will kindle the enthusiasm of young scholars in the field and inspire them to proceed in this comparatively new area of research and explore further and more interesting possibilities. (shrink)

The last work of the eminent philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal, this book traces the origins of logical theory in India.

This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to (...) any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed. (shrink)

The idea of symmetry is one of the most important and pervasive ideas, occurring in disciplines ranging from the sciences to the arts. Symmetry is manifested very widely in the natural world as seen in the intricate shapes, patterns and colours of both inanimate and animate beings. It is a guiding principle in modern physics and is an integral part of many important works in architecture, sculpture, music, painting and so on. -/- This booksdiscuss some of the essential themes that (...) will help us understand the philosophical foundations of symmetry in all its manifestations. The philosophical analysis is in two parts: metaphysical and phenomenological. The first draws upon metaphysics and considers the relation between symmetry and categories such as objects, form, properties, laws, invariance and change, thereby exhibiting symmetry as an 'essential' property that inheres in objects and processes. This part also discusses in some detail the metaphysics of groups, which are the mathematical objects that describe symmetry in science. -/- There is also a significant phenomenological experience of symmetry, which is captured by the use of terms such as balance, unity, simplicity, beauty, boredom and harmony. The phenomenological analysis of symmetry begins with phenomenology of perception, then considers the relation between Gestalt principles of vision and symmetry, and finally addresses the aesthetics of symmetry, which includes a discussion on the relation between beauty and symmetry. (shrink)

Philosophy Of Science Draws Upon Different Traditions In Western Philosophy, Starting From The Ancient Greek. However, There Is A Conspicuous Absence Of Non-Western Philosophical Traditions, Including The Indian, In Philosophy Of Science. This Book Argues That Indian Rational Traditions Such As Indian Logic, Drawn From Both Buddhist And Nyaya Philosophies, Are Not Only Relevant For Philosophy Of Science But Are Also Intrinsically Concerned With Scientific Methodology. It Also Suggests That The Indian Logical Traditions Can Be Understood As Requiring That Logic (...) Itself Be Scientific. This Explains Their Engagement With Ideas Such As Valid Inference, Invariable Concomitance, The Use Of The Empirical In Logical Analysis, The Move From Observations To Statements About These Observations And So On. The Essential Relation Between Some Indian Philosophical Traditions And Science Is Further Illustrated By The Semiotic Character Of Indian Logic, Its Explanatory Structures Which Are Similar To Those Of Scientific Explanations, Indian Theories Of Knowledge And Truth, The Pragmatic Nature Of Truth And Its Relation To Action Which Is Essential To Nyaya And To Science, And Finally The Importance Of The Effability Thesis Which Is Central To Nyaya, Bhartrhari And Modern Science. The Book Introduces The Reader To Important Themes In Indian Logic, Epistemology And Philosophy Of Language As Well As Philosophy Of Science. Relationships Between These Various Traditions Are Also Explored Thereby Suggesting How Indian Philosophy Can Engage With Contemporary Philosophy Of Science. This Introductory Book Will Be Valuable For Students, Professional Philosophers As Well As Those Interested In Indian Philosophy And Its Significance To Contemporary Thought. (shrink)

This book outlines a major new theory of natural laws. The book begins with the question of whether there are any genuinely law-like phenomena in nature. The discussion addresses questions currently being debated by metaphysicians such as whether the laws of nature are necessary or contingent and whether a property can be identified independently of its causal role.

Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other, and whose (...) identities depend on their roles in these processes. Natural objects must behave as they do, because to do otherwise would be contrary to their natures. The laws of nature are, therefore, metaphysically necessary, and consequently, there are necessary connections between events. Brian Ellis calls for the rejection of the theory of Humean Supervenience and an implementation of a new kind of realism in philosophical analysis. (shrink)

Articles, most previously published in periodicals, 1955-1975.