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  1. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • "Personal Identity: The Non-Branching Form of" What Matters.Jennifer E. Whiting - 2002 - In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190–218.
    This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV.
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  • Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):456-461.
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  • Some Episodes in the Sameness of Consciousness.Alan Sidelle - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):269-293.
  • Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
    What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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  • Brown-Brownson Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):573-593.
    The case of Brown and Brownson can be thought of as an updated version of John Locke’s prince-cobbler example, one that replaces a soul transfer with a brain transplant. Briefly, Brown and Robinson are operated on for the removal of brain tumors by a procedure that involves the temporary removal of the brain from the skull, and by a surgical blunder Brown’s brain ends up in Robinson’s skull; the resulting person, Brownson, has Brown’s brain and Robinson’s body, and his psychological (...)
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  • Branching self-consciousness.Carol Rovane - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):355-95.
  • Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
  • Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
    I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...)
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  • Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
  • Memory and persons.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):289-337.
    I want to reflect on some functions of memory and their relations to traditional issues about personal identity. I try to elicit ways in which having memory, with its presupposition of agent identity over time, is integral to being a person, indeed to having a representational mind.
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  • Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Philosophy 79 (307):133-141.
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  • Persons and their pasts.Sydney Shoemaker - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
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