The theory of human moral evolution elaborated in the later work of Jürgen Habermas represents one of the most challenging and provocative of recent, linguistically inspired attempts to reinterpret our understanding of Western history. In critically examining this theory, the present article identifies some major problems with Habermas's reinterpretation of the history of the formation of Western civilization as the universal pragmatic process of the evolution of human moral communicative competences. Drawing on the works of Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault, (...) the article seeks to show how the formal grounding of Habermas's evolutionary theory in the categories of his universal pragmatic conception of communicative action ultimately prevents him from grasping the radically embodied nature of human discursive practice and its implications for the historical process of the formation of human moral will. (shrink)

The out?dated intentionalistic assumptions manifest in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action undermine a solution to the problem of order in action theory beyond utilitarianism. An analysis of his intersubjectivistic conception, which is based on the theory of the speech?act, shows that the incompleteness of Habermas's linguistic turn is due to his attempt to revive the older Critical Theory's concept of critique. The claims for a scientifically well?founded revival of a universal concept of reason ? which are asserted in this concept (...) ? invalidate the intersubjectivistic paradigm in action theory and therefore obstruct the way to a de?individualized formulation of the theory of social contract that avoids the paradox of utilitarian models. (shrink)

A collection of provocative, in-depth debates between Jurgen Habermas and a wide range of his critics relating to the philosopher's contribution to legal and democratic theory as published in his book BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS. Essential reading for philosophers, legal scholars, and political and social theorists concerned with understanding the work of one of the leading philosophers of our age.

This article discusses Habermas’s project of reformulating Critical Theory through a pragmatic philosophy of communication, while defending post-metaphysical reason and commitment to grounded critique. Habermas’s use of pragmatics is contrasted with Rorty, who argues for a non-foundational pragmatism that eschews the idea of science as the only site of reason and social progress. The argument moves through three stages. First, it outlines Habermas’s project of recovering critical activity with particular attention to his debt to pragmatic philosophy and the departures from (...) earlier Critical Theory that this entailed. Second, it examines his theory of communicative action and identifies some key areas of contestation with sceptical approaches. Finally, it identifies some of the problems and limitations in Habermas’s pragmatic turn, suggesting that his quasi-transcendental critique is developed at the expense of a pragmatic commitment to grounding in embodied agency-in-the-world. It concludes that the spirit of pragmatism, rather than its detail, might help Critical Theory focus on political analysis and resistances to domination. (shrink)

This long-awaited book sets out the implications of Habermas's theory of communicative action for moral theory. "Discourse ethics" attempts to reconstruct a moral point of view from which normative claims can be impartially judged. The theory of justice it develops replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of justification based on reasoned agreement among participants in practical discourse.Habermas connects communicative ethics to the theory of social action via an examination of research in the social psychology of moral and interpersonal development. (...) He aims to show that our basic moral intuitions spring from something deeper and more universal than contingent features of our tradition, namely from normative presuppositions of social interaction that belong to the repertoire of competent agents in any society. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. (shrink)

(1997). Sociology of knowledge and the sociology of scientific knowledge. Social Epistemology: Vol. 11, New Directions in the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 187-192.

Habermas and Nino see human rights not as an external constraint on popular sovereignty, but rather as a key ingredient of true democracy. Yet, Habermas asserts that democratic deliberation involves moral, ethical, pragmatic, and negotiated matters, while Nino reduces democracy to moral deliberation. Habermass theory thus is more complex and takes more seriously the possibility that deliberative democracy may vary across societies. All the same, Habermas excessively limits the extent of legitimate variability inasmuch as he shares with Nino the conviction (...) that moral reasons are universal and ultimately decisive. Habermas and Nino converge, more fundamentally, when they exclude the non-deliberative (and non-dialogic) aspects of the democratic process. It is a mistake to disregard these elements or to characterize them as oblique manifestations of deliberation. By taking these features into account, a picture of democracy gains in plausibility and opens up additional space for diversity in democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

In his most seminal book, Herbert Marcuse sharply objects to what he saw as pervasive one-dimensional thinking-the uncritical and conformist acceptance of existing structures, norms and behaviours. Originally published in 1964, One Dimensional Man quickly became one of the most important texts in the politically radical sixties. Marcuse's searing indictment of Western society remains as chillingly relevant today as it was at its first writing.

Habermas's theory of social evolution has been subjected to critique by environmentally motivated sociologists. They argue that his decision to recast social theory in terms of an extended, if selective analogy with biology leads him into a set of practical positions that are irreconcilable with Green politics and inconsistent with the goals of traditional critical theory. This article argues that these criticisms are based on an inaccurate assessment of the role of evolutionary concepts in Habermas's thought. By drawing out the (...) similarities between Habermas and Kant on the question of the relationship between history and natural history, it is possible to see that Habermas's use of evolutionary metaphors plays a regulative rather than a constitutive role in his thinking on society. This strategy does not save Habermas's position, but shows instead that it may be vulnerable to an immanent critique that pulls out the real underlying antagonisms in his system. (shrink)

Democratic politics might be defined as the agonistic struggle of different parties, groups or individuals over resources, recognition and influence under reciprocal and inclusive conditions. It is based on an unconditional orientation to equality as well as freedom of all those involved to consent to - or dissent from - the norms, policies and practices that are established in the process of public dialogue. This article reconstructs the general agent-based capabilities required for a democratically defined public sphere under conditions of (...) globalization. Making capabilities central is intended to correct a certain over-emphasis regarding institutional macro-structures in the discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism. After setting the stage with a critical analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s concept of capabilities, the analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first part, a notion of hermeneutic agency is introduced that avoids a Foucauldian reduction of agency to power structures, while thoroughly situating agency in a symbolically mediated social context. The symbolic mediation of agency is, in the second part, taken as a ground of potentiality for reflexive capabilities that, once actualized and enacted, allow for a normatively satisfying process of public deliberation. The aim of the analysis is to relate a normative model of value-orientation to the linguistically grounded empirical resources of social agents. The core argument lays out as basic capabilities (1) to be able to normatively orient oneself at contextually defined yet universally open postconventional commitments, (2) to be able to engage in an interpretive and dialogical perspective-taking vis-a-vis differently situated agents and backgrounds, and (3) to be able to critically distance oneself from one’s taken-for-granted assumptions and background structures via a power-alert social reflexivity. (shrink)

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ?Linguistic competence? for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ?monologism?, ?a priorism?, and ?elementarism?. The author offers an outline of a theory of (...) communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ?performative utterance?, the author elucidates the role of dialogue?constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a?; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis. (shrink)

Habermas's analysis of rational action is the fulcrum for his broader theoretical project. If that analysis is faulty his larger project is jeopardized. I explore the role Habermas assigns to strategic action in order to scrutinize his central concept of communicative action. Using basic game theoretic concepts as a counterpoint I argue that he both misconstrues stategic action and fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. I conclude by sketching several ways that Habermas might seek to rectify deficiencies (...) in his analysis of rational action. (shrink)

This collection of ten essays offers the first systematic assessment of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Jurgen Habermas's masterful defense of the rational potential of the modern age. An opening essay by Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves orients the debate between Habermas and the postmodernists by identifying two different senses of responsibility. Habermas's own essay discusses the themes of his book in the context of a critical engagement with neoconservative cultural and political trends. The main body of essays is divided into two (...) sections-Critical Rejoinders and Thematic Reformulations. These essays offer an important set of perspectives on Habermas's position by philosophers, social scientists, intellectual historians, and literary critics.(publisher, edited). (shrink)

2. Class,. class. conflict. and. the. development. of. capitalism: critical. theory. and. political. economy. In the last ten years the work of the best- known representatives of the Frankfurt school has come to be associated with two basic concerns: ...

The writings of the Frankfurt school, in particular of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas, caught the imagination of the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s and became a key element in the Marxism of the New Left. Partly due to their rise to prominence during the political turmoil of the 1960s, the work of these critical theorists has been the subject of continuing controversy in both political and academic circles. However, their ideas are frequently misunderstood. In this major (...) work, now available from Polity Press, David Held presents a much-needed introduction to, and evaluation of, critical theory. Some of the major themes he considers are critical theory's relation to Marx's critique of political economy, Freudian psychoanalysis, aesthetics and the philosophy of history. There is also an extended discussion of critical theory's substantive contribution to the analysis of capitalism, culture, the family, the individual, as well as its contribution to epistemology and methodology. (shrink)

Religious toleration first became legally enshrined in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Religious toleration led to the practice of more general inter-subjective recognition of members of democratic states which took precedence over differences of conviction and practice. After considering the extent to which a democracy may defend itself against the enemies of democracy and to which it should be prepared to tolerate civil disobedience, the article analyses the contemporary dialectic between the notion of civil inclusion and multiculturalism. Religious (...) toleration is seen as the pacemaker for modern multiculturalism, in which the claims of minorities to civic inclusion are recognized so long as members of all groups understand themselves to be citizens of one and the same political community. Footnotes1 Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, 2003. (shrink)

L’examen de la philosophie kantienne de la religion sur ses deux fronts (le dogmatisme théologique et le scepticisme des Lumières) et celui de sa postérité contrastée (pour l’essentiel, Hegel et l’hégélo-marxisme, Schleiermacher et la culture du protestantisme, Kierkegaard et la dialectique existentielle) permettent de poser cette question : comment s’approprier l’héritage sémantique des traditions religieuses (et spécialement l’idée d’un « règne de Dieu sur terre » et celle d’une « république éthique ») sans estomper la frontière entre foi et savoir, (...) donc : comment aujourd’hui s’approprier rationnellement les contenus religieux face à ce qui menace la raison de l’extérieur (les réactions fondamentalistes) comme de l’intérieur (la normativité en crise) de la modernité? (shrink)

L’examen de la philosophie kantienne de la religion sur ses deux fronts (le dogmatisme théologique et le scepticisme des Lumières) et celui de sa postérité contrastée (pour l’essentiel, Hegel et l’hégélo-marxisme, Schleiermacher et la culture du protestantisme, Kierkegaard et la dialectique existentielle) permettent de poser cette question : comment s’approprier l’héritage sémantique des traditions religieuses (et spécialement l’idée d’un « règne de Dieu sur terre » et celle d’une « république éthique ») sans estomper la frontière entre foi et savoir, (...) donc : comment aujourd’hui s’approprier rationnellement les contenus religieux face à ce qui menace la raison de l’extérieur (les réactions fondamentalistes) comme de l’intérieur (la normativité en crise) de la modernité? (shrink)

Knowledge and human liberation are epochal challenges and a key question here is what the meaning of knowledge and the meaning of human liberation are. This article argues that knowledge means not only knowledge of self, society and nature as conceived within the predominant dualistic logic of modernity but also knowledge of transcendental self beyond sociological role playing, knowledge of nature beyond anthropocentric reduction and control, and knowledge of cosmos, God and transcendence in an interconnected spirit of autonomy and interpenetration. (...) Liberation means not only liberation from oppressive structures but also liberation from one’s ego and the will to control and dominate. The article discusses the transformative link between knowledge and liberation through a critical dialogue with Jürgen Habermas and Sri Aurobindo, focusing mainly on their works, Knowledge and Human Interests and Synthesis of Yoga. The article does not simply compare and contrast Habermas and Sri Aurobindo or compare and contrast the so-called Western rationality and Eastern spirituality but seeks to create a condition for transformative criticism for both. (shrink)

This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I defend the (...) former by showing that it is not only intuitively compelling, but also particularly well equipped for addressing four important objections recently levelled against discourse ethics and its political applications. I conclude by pointing out some consequences of the previous discussion for the future of Critical Theory. (shrink)

Habermas and Apel commonly defend a form of universal moral theory that is also postmetaphysical. Still, they differ with respect to both the character and the justification of a universal moral principle. Habermas denies and Apel asserts that this principle is a transcendental condition of life practice or human activity as such, and each criticizes the claims of the other. This paper argues that each is correct in his criticism of the other and, therefore, both are wrong. The contention between (...) them cannot be resolved within the post metaphysical conviction they have in common, and the reasons for this conclusion imply that a universal moral principle cannot be redeemed independently of metaphysics. (shrink)

Discourse ethics is originally conceived as a programme of philosophical justification of morality. This depends on the formal derivation of the moral principle (U) from non-moral principles. The moral theory is supposed to fall out of a pragmatic theory of meaning. The original programme plays a central role in Habermas's social theory: the moral theory, if true, provides good evidence for the more general theory of modernization. But neither Habermas nor his followers have succeeded in providing a formal derivation. This (...) essay shows how and why Habermas's proposed derivation is impossible. As if aware of the lacuna, Habermas has recently suggested that (U) can be derived by 'abduction' rather than deduction. The proposal draws heavily on modernization theory; hence the only justification for (U) now available to him rests on premises drawn from that theory. The original programme of the justification of morality has thus given way to the weaker programme of the philosophical elucidation of morality. Further, since Habermas's moral theory is no longer justified independently of modernization theory, but at least partly by it, the moral theory cannot without circularity provide evidence for the modernization theory. (shrink)