We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...) understood. (shrink)

Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also (...) hold that such a state of affairs is morally better, all things considered, than one where supporting inclination is present. Henson's proposals seem to me both serious and plausible. I do not think that either of his models, in the end, can take on the role Kant assigns to moral worth in the argument of the Groundwork. But seeing the ways Henson's account diverges from Kant's makes clearer what Kant intended in his discussion of those actions he credits with moral worth. [...] An action has moral worth if it is required by duty and has as its primary motive the motive of duty. The motive of duty need not reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect); it must, however, be the interest that determines the agent's acting as he did. (shrink)

The first two sections of this paper are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kant's Theory of Freedom held in Washington D.C. on 28 December 1992 under the auspices of the North American Kant Society. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium in Chicago on 24 April 1993 at the APA Western Division meetings. The fourth section deals with (...) some general criticisms of my treatment of Kant's theory of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks, who was also a participant in the second symposium, in an earlier piece published in Inquiry and by Paul Guyer in a review. The paper as a whole is thus an attempt to reformulate and clarify some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction. (shrink)

In this thesis I focus attention on views about the nature of morally good persons and actions which are associated with the Kantian tradition in ethics. After a short introductory chapter, Chapter II outlines the Kantian view that morally good persons are motivated by a sense of duty, not by inclination. I try to explain why many people have found this view problematic and in need of defence. In Chapter III, I try to explain the view that morally good persons (...) are motivated by reason, not by desire. I try to show that this view is distinct from the view outlined in Chapter II and I consider attempts by authors like John McDowell, Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn to show that we can be motivated by reason. In Chapter IV I critically examine arguments which Kantians use, or might use, to defend the views on moral worth set out in Chapters II and III. Then, in Chapter V, I consider how the views of Philippa Foot on the nature of moral reasons might be construed as an attack on the Kantian view of moral worth and I try to show how Kantians might try to defuse this attack. Chapters VI and VII examine the views put forth by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism. I devote this space to a discussion of Nagel's views partly because Chapter IV assumes that the main thesis of Nagel's book cannot be defended but also because Nagel's defence of a Kantian conception of moral psychology is of considerable interest in itself. (shrink)