This volume consists of the first of the John Dewey Lectures delivered under the auspices of Columbia University's Philosophy Department as well as other essays by the author. Intended to clarify the meaning of the philosophical doctrines propounded by Professor Quine in 'Word and Objects', the essays included herein both support and expand those doctrines.

This is the third volume of Hilary Putnam's philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the 'realist'_position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate.

INTRODUCTION Before Kant almost every philosopher subscribed to the view that truth is some kind of correspondence between ideas and 'what is the case'. ...

First published in 1978, this reissue presents a seminal philosophical work by professor Putnam, in which he puts forward a conception of knowledge which makes ethics, practical knowledge and non-mathematic parts of the social sciences just as much parts of 'knowledge' as the sciences themselves. He also rejects the idea that knowledge can be demarcated from non-knowledge by the fact that the former alone adheres to 'the scientific method'. The first part of the book consists of Professor Putnam's John Locke (...) lectures, delivered at the University of Oxford in 1976, offering a detailed examination of a 'physicalist' theory of reference against a background of the works of Tarski, Carnap, Popper, Hempel and Kant. The analysis then extends to notions of truth, the character of linguistic enquiry and social scientific enquiry in general, interconnecting with the great metaphysical problem of realism, the nature of language and reference, and the character of ourselves. (shrink)

Philosophy, Aristotle is well known to have said, begins in wonder. So, of course, does everything else. Astronomy begins in wonder at the moving lights in the sky; biology, in wonder at the living creatures of the earth; psychology, in wonder at the intricacies and eccentricities of our distinctively human form of life. So, at best, wonder is only a necessary condition for philosophy. What. is peculiar about philosophers is what we are inclined to wonder about. We wonder about everything. (...) In particular, we wonder about astron omy and biology and psychology (and about philosophy) - about whether and how such disciplines are possible and, crucially, about whether and how such disciplines fit together. We don't just wonder about everything. We wonder about everything all at once. Philosophers are general practitioners. Things stand ill with our disciplme today. There was quite recently at large in America an occasional publication under the title Jobs in Philosophy. The title rested upon a confusion, and the publication furthered the confusion upon which it rested. For it did not, in fact, list jobs in philosophy. It couldn't. (shrink)