Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads to ontological levels and cumulativity of knowledge. It is applied to a defense of realism (...) against recent attacks by Laudan. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, M. Frisch claims to have proven that classical electrodynamics is an inconsistent physical theory. We argue that he has applied classical electrodynamics inconsistently. Frisch also claims that all other classical theories of electromagnetic phenomena, when consistent and in some sense an approximation of classical electrodynamics, are haunted by “serious conceptual problems” that defy resolution. We argue that this claim is based on a partisan if not misleading presentation of theoretical research in classical electrodynamics.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37: 263–282. [preprint] This paper is a critical discussion of Mathias Frisch’s book Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Nonlocality.

This paper addresses a relatively common scientific (as opposed to philosophical) conception of intertheoretic reduction between physical theories. This is the sense of reduction in which one (typically newer and more refined) theory is said to reduce to another (typically older and coarser) theory in the limit as some small parameter tends to zero. Three examples of such reductions are discussed: First, the reduction of Special Relativity (SR) to Newtonian Mechanics (NM) as (v/c)20; second, the reduction of wave optics to (...) geometrical optics as 0; and third, the reduction of Quantum Mechanics (QM) to Classical Mechanics (CM) as0. I argue for the following two claims. First, the case of SR reducing to NM is an instance of a genuine reductive relationship while the latter two cases are not. The reason for this concerns the nature of the limiting relationships between the theory pairs. In the SR/NM case, it is possible to consider SR as a regular perturbation of NM; whereas in the cases of wave and geometrical optics and QM/CM, the perturbation problem is singular. The second claim I wish to support is that as a result of the singular nature of the limits between these theory pairs, it is reasonable to maintain that third theories exist describing the asymptotic limiting domains. In the optics case, such a theory has been called catastrophe optics. In the QM/CM case, it is semiclassical mechanics. Aspects of both theories are discussed in some detail. (shrink)

Frederick Suppe has come to enjoy a position of undisputed leadership in the post-positivistic philosophy of science.

Mathias Frisch provides the first sustained philosophical discussion of conceptual problems in classical particle-field theories. Part of the book focuses on the problem of a satisfactory equation of motion for charged particles interacting with electromagnetic fields. As Frisch shows, the standard equation of motion results in a mathematically inconsistent theory, yet there is no fully consistent and conceptually unproblematic alternative theory. Frisch describes in detail how the search for a fundamental equation of motion is partly driven by pragmatic considerations (like (...) simplicity and mathematical tractability) that can override the aim for full consistency. The book also offers a comprehensive review and criticism of both the physical and philosophical literature on the temporal asymmetry exhibited by electromagnetic radiation fields, including Einstein's discussion of the asymmetry and Wheeler and Feynman's influential absorber theory of radiation. Frisch argues that attempts to derive the asymmetry from thermodynamic or cosmological considerations fail and proposes that we should understand the asymmetry as due to a fundamental causal constraint. The book's overarching philosophical thesis is that standard philosophical accounts that strictly identify scientific theories with a mathematical formalism and a mapping function specifying the theory's ontology are inadequate, since they permit neither inconsistent yet genuinely successful theories nor thick causal notions to be part of fundamental physics. (shrink)

This dissertation deals with several aspects of the physical interpretation of theories: the use of idealizations in scientific theorizing, the use of theories as conceptual devices and the problem of scientific realism. These issues are considered in the light of the semantic conception of theories and a case history. The case history concerns the development of models of stellar stucture from the earliest models to the "standard model" of Arthur Eddington. ;The semantic conception of theories makes it possible to give (...) formal analyses of several concepts related to idealization: approximation, simplification and abstraction. The concept of idealization stands out as having intrinsic pragmatic and epistemological dimensions which cannot be analyzed in terms of the semantic conception. In light of the case history it is suggested that there is an organization to the concepts which determine the structure of model. Following ideas taken from the artificial intelligence literature, it is argued that the concepts are organized into a kind of associative network which is called a "theoretical network." ;Eddington's "standard model" of the stars is looked at as an example of the use of theories as conceptual devices. The standard model acquired physical significance by degrees over two decades. Its history sheds light on the process by which theories acquire physical significance. An account of the physical interpretation is introduced which relies upon the idea of the theoretical network. On this view theories acquire physical significance by the filling of "slots" within the theoretical network. ;The ideas developed concerning the interpretation of theories are finally used to discuss the problem of scientific realism. A "quasi-realistic" interpretation of theories is developed in contrast to the anti-realistic interpretations of Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking. The quasi-realistic position defended asserts that the laws of physics give accurate representations of the world, but these representations are counterfactual. The devices introduced in the dissertation make it possible to understand how such counterfactual representations are evaluated. (shrink)