Search results for '俞麗霞' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  27
    Peter Achinstein (1992). The Evidence Against Kronz. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):169-175.
  2.  46
    Donald C. Ainslie (2002). Bioethics and the Problem of Pluralism. Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):1-28.
    The state that we inhabit plays a significant role in shaping our lives. For not only do its institutions constrain the kinds of lives we can lead, (...)
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  3.  74
    Kathleen Akins (1993). A Bat Without Qualities? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell 345--358.
  4. Kathleen Akins (1993). What is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell
  5.  43
    J. McKenzie Alexander (2006). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 149 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):441-448.
  6. Sophie R. Allen (2006). A Space Oddity: Colin McGinn on Consciousness and Space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):61-82.
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  7.  14
    Barry Allen (2003). Knowledge and Civilization. Westview Press.
    Knowledge and Civilization advances detailed criticism of philosophy's usual approach to knowledge and describes a redirection, away from textbook problems of epistemology, toward an ecological philosophy (...)of technology and civilization. Rejecting theories that confine knowledge to language or discourse, Allen situates knowledge in the greater field of artifacts, technical performance, and human evolution. His wide ranging considerations draw on ideas from evolutionary biology, archaeology, anthropology, and the history of cities, art, and technology. (shrink)
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  8.  12
    J. Almog (2005). 'What Am I?' Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem - Reply. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):717-734.
    In his Meditations, René Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I (...)
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  9.  68
    William P. Alston & Thomas W. Smythe (1994). Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-33.
  10. Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
    Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves (...) the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine physicalism unless physicalism entails that all physical facts are discursively learnable, and that the latter entailment is questionable. (shrink)
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  11. Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press 65--76.
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts about consciousness that are (...)
     
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  12. Torin Alter, Garrett on Causal Essentialism and Zombies.
  13. Torin Alter (2007). Imagining Subjective Absence: Marcus on Zombies. Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.
    Many philosophers accept the conceivability of zombies: creatures that lack consciousness but are physically and functionally identical to conscious human beings. Many also believe that the conceivability (...)
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  14. Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
    David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to (...)
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  15. Torin Alter (1995). Mary's New Perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):585-84.
    I wish to consider an objection to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument recently made by Derk Pereboom.
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  16. Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.
    In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand (...)
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  17. Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected (...)
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  18. Torin Alter (forthcoming). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such (...)
     
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  19. Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that everything is physical. The general thrust (...)
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  20. Torin Alter (2007). The Knowledge Argument. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy. But some doubt that phenomenal (...)
     
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  21. James T. Anderson, A Simple Refutation of the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.
    One of the most persuasive objections to the identity thesis.
     
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  22. David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role (...)
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  23.  25
    Frederick Anderson (1942). The Relational Theory of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 39 (May):253-260.
  24. Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239-263.
    Intuitively it has seemed to many that our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On (...)
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  25. Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical (...) theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper. (shrink)
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  26. Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of Consciousness, Kinds of Consciousness, Meanings of 'Consciousness'. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16.
    The use of expressions likeconcepts of consciousness’, ‘kinds of consciousness’, andmeanings ofconsciousness’’ interchangeably is ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is argued that this (...)
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  27. Michael V. Antony (2001). Conceiving Simple Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-86.
    That consciousness is composed of simple or basic elements that combine to form complex experiences is an idea with a long history. This idea is approached through (...)
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  28. Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
    It is widely assumed thatconsciousnessis multiply ambiguous within the consciousness literature. Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, (...)creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine: ‘ consciousnessis best viewed as univocal within the literature. The second point is that researchers would do best to avoid the semantics ofconsciousness ’, since resorting tosemantic ascenttypically serves no clear purpose in the case of consciousness, and confuses matters more than anything else. (shrink)
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  29.  84
    Michael V. Antony (1999). Outline of a General Methodology for Consciousness Research. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2):43-56.
    In spite of the enormous interdisciplinary interest in consciousness these days, sorely lacking are general methodologies in terms of which individual research efforts across disciplines can be (...)
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  30.  81
    Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical (...) theories of consciousness are false. (shrink)
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  31. István Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' Zombie Argument. In Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University
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  32. István Aranyosi (2010). Powers and the MindBody Problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.
    This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which (...)properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality. (shrink)
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  33. István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  34. Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University
     
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  35.  59
    David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
  36. David M. Armstrong (1983). Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff
     
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  37. David M. Armstrong (1979). Three Types of Consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69) 235.
  38. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
  39. Marcus Arvan (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with (...) the physical world that underlies appearances.". (shrink)
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  40. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2001). Consciousness, Conceivability Arguments, and Perspectivalism: The Dialectics of the Debate. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):99-122.
  41. Jay E. Bachrach (1990). Qualia and Theory Reduction: A Criticism of Paul Churchland. Iyyun 281.
  42.  8
    Lee Badger (1980). Beth's Property Fails in $L^{. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (2):284-290.
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  43. Joan Bagaria & W. Hugh Woodin (1997). $\Underset{\Tilde}{\Delta}^1_n$ Sets of Reals. Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4):1379-1428.
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  44. Alexander Bain (1894). Definition and Problems of Consciousness. Mind 3 (11):348-361.
  45. Alexander Bain (1883). Mind and Body. Mind 8 (31):402-412.
  46. Andrew R. Bailey, Physicalism and the Preposterousness of Zombies.
  47. Andrew R. Bailey, The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability.
    It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability (...)
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  48. Andrew R. Bailey, Zombies Support Biological Theories of Consciousness.
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  49. John R. Baker (1946). A Critique of Materialism. Hibbert Journal 45:31-37.
     
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  50. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosophers Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The (...)Philosophers Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical descriptionthis is calledthe a priori entailment thesisbut ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombiesare metaphysically possible. I attempt to show that this argument is refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is invalid. (shrink)
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