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  1.  546 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  2.  331 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
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  3.  271 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  4.  215 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to Active Externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge
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  5.  180 DLs
    Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  6.  166 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
  7.  157 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
  8.  147 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal (...)
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  9.  122 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (2001). Empathy, Neural Imaging and the Theory Versus Simulation Debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.
  10.  113 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams, Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.
  11.  79 DLs
    Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  12.  61 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  13.  58 DLs
    Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele (1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
  14.  57 DLs
    Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear (...)
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  15.  55 DLs
    Frederick Adams, Names That Name Nothing.
    This paper defends a direct reference view of empty names, saying that empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths. However, all names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmatically imparted truths. A sentence such as “Vulcan doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts that there is no tenth planet. This view is defended against objections.
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  16.  51 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1991). He Doesn't Really Want to Try. Analysis 51 (2):109 - 112.
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  17.  50 DLs
    Frederick Adams (2001). Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System Alicia Juarrero. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):635-640.
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  18.  46 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
  19.  45 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  20.  41 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem". Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  21.  40 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  22.  36 DLs
    Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  23.  34 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
  24.  33 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
  25.  27 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1989). Book Review:Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Michael E. Bratman. [REVIEW] Ethics 100 (1):198-.
  26.  27 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1993). Thoughts Without Objects. Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
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  27.  25 DLs
    Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
  28.  25 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
    What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...)
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  29.  25 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1995). Trying. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
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  30.  22 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams & Gary Fuller (1992). Names, Contents, and Causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.
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  31.  14 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1991). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
  32.  13 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (1979). A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.
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  33.  13 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1994). Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):613 - 626.
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  34.  13 DLs
    Frederick Adams & David Kline (1987). Nomic Reliabilism: Weak Reliability is Not Enough. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):433-443.
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  35.  12 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1986). Feedback About Feedback: Reply to Ehring. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123-131.
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  36.  12 DLs
    Frederick Adams (2005). Preface. Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):1-1.
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  37.  11 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller (1992). Rules in Programming Languages and Networks. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum
  38.  9 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1993). Reply to Russow. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
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  39.  8 DLs
    Frederick Adams & Berent Enc (1988). Not Quite By Accident. Dialogue 27 (02):287-.
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  40.  7 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1992). Machine Persons. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):47-55.
  41.  7 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1986). The Function of Epistemic Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.
    Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.
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  42.  6 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1992). The Future of Folk Psychology. Teaching Philosophy 15 (4):385-388.
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  43.  6 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (2002). The Nature of Meaningfulness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):484-488.
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  44.  6 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1989). Tertiary Waywardness Tamed. Critica 21 (61):117 - 125.
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  45.  6 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1994). Of Epicycles and Elegance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):637 - 641.
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  46.  3 DLs
    Frederick Adams (1991). Audi on Structural Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
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  47.  1 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (2002). Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
  48.  1 DLs
    Frederick Adams, Wilson Geisler, David Over, Woo-Kyoung Ahn, LouAnn Gerken, Thomas Palmeri, Kathleen Akins, Lisa Gershkoff-Stowe, David Papineau & Gerry Altmann (2002). Acknowledgment: Guest Reviewers. Cognitive Science 26:841-842.
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  49.  1 DLs
    Frederick Adams (2007). Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):1-5.
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  50.  0 DLs
    Frederick R. Adams (1991). Causal Contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
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