Search results for 'Contextualism' (try it on Scholar)

991 found
Sort by:
  1. Linguistic Basis Contextualism (2004). Special Issue: Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond. Philosophical Studies 119:343-344.score: 180.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Radical Contextualism, Josef Stern, James Conant, Michael Kremer, David Finkelstein & Jason Bridges (2007). Nat Hansen. Philosophy 2:2006-2007.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gate-Keeping Contextualism (2011). David Henderson. Episteme 8:83-98.score: 30.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2013). Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity. Inquiry 56 (2-3):149-178.score: 24.0
    According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might plausibly (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Carl Baker (2012). Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.score: 24.0
    In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism— individualized indexical contextualism —I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions. OUP. 104-119.score: 24.0
    In this chapter, I produce counterexamples to Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC), a view about the semantics of ‘knowledge’-ascriptions that I have argued for elsewhere. According to PEC, the semantic content of the predicate ‘know’ at a context C is partly determined by the speakers’ pragmatic presuppositions at C. The problem for the view that I shall be concerned with here arises from the fact that pragmatic presuppositions are sometimes known to be true by the speakers who make them: hence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltan Gendler Szabo (2013). Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies (2):1-53.score: 24.0
    Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. Yet it is widely thought that epistemic contextualism does not have a plausible semantic implementation. We aim to overcome this concern by articulating and defending an explicit contextualist semantics for ‘know,’ which integrates a fairly orthodox contextualist conception of knowledge as the elimination of the relevant alternatives, with a fairly orthodox “Amherst” semantics for A-quantification over a contextually variable domain of situations. Whatever problems epistemic contextualism might face, lack of an orthodox semantic implementation (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.score: 24.0
    Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robin McKenna (2011). Interests Contextualism. Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.score: 24.0
    In this paper I develop a version of contextualism that I call interests contextualism. Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the ascriber’s interests and purposes. It therefore stands in opposition to the usual view on which the truth-conditions are partly determined by the ascriber’s conversational context. I give an argument against one particular implementation of the usual view, differentiate interests contextualism from other prominent versions (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gunnar Björnsson & Alexander Almér (2009). Contextualism, Assessor Relativism, and Insensitive Assessments. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):363-372.score: 24.0
    Recently, contextualism about epistemic modals and predicates of taste have come under fire from advocates of assessment relativistic analyses. Contextualism, they have argued, fails to account for what we call "felicitous insensitive assessments". In this paper, we provide one hitherto overlooked way in which contextualists can embrace the phenomenon by slightly modifying an assumption that has remained in the background in most of the debate over contextualism and relativism. Finally, we briefly argue that the resulting contextualist account (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2011). A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25.score: 24.0
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. Recently, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Claudia Bianchi, Contextualism. Handbook of Pragmatics Online.score: 24.0
    Contextualism is a view about meaning, semantic content and truth-conditions, bearing significant consequences for the characterisation of explicit and implicit content, the decoding/inferring distinction and the semantics/pragmatics interface. According to the traditional perspective in semantics (called "literalism" or "semantic minimalism"), it is possible to attribute truth-conditions to a sentence independently of any context of utterance, i.e. in virtue of its meaning alone. We must then distinguish between the proposition literally expressed by a sentence ("what is said" by the sentence, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. John Turri (2010). Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism. Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.score: 24.0
    In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Robin McKenna (2012). Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Writings.score: 24.0
    In the recent philosophy of language literature there is a debate over whether contextualist accounts of the semantics of various terms can accommodate intuitions of disagreement in certain cases involving those terms. Relativists such as John MacFarlane have claimed that this motivates adopting a form of relativist semantics for these terms because the relativist can account for the same data as contextualists but doesn’t face this problem of disagreement (MacFarlane 2005, 2007 and 2009). In this paper I focus on the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.score: 24.0
    In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretskes Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozicks Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 24.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.score: 24.0
    Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Evelyn Brister (2009). Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.score: 24.0
    Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Matthew Chrisman (2007). From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I exploit the parallel between epistemic contextualism and metaethical speaker-relativism to argue that a promising way out of two of the primary problems facing contextualism is one already explored in some detail in the ethical case – viz. expressivism. The upshot is an argument for a form of epistemic expressivism modeled on a familiar form of ethical expressivism. This provides a new nondescriptivist option for understanding the meaning of knowledge attributions, which arguably better captures the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.score: 24.0
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jason Bridges (2010). Wittgenstein Vs Contextualism. In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    A critique of attempts by Charles Travis and others to read contextualism back into Philosophical Investigations. The central interpretive claim is that this reading is not only unsupported; it gets Wittgenstein's intent, in the parts of the text at issue, precisely backwards. The focus of the chapter is on Wittgenstein's treatment of explanation, understanding, proper names, and family-resemblance concepts.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.score: 24.0
    Epistemic contextualism is widely believed to be incompatible with the recently popular view that knowledge is the norm of assertion, practical reasoning, or belief. I argue in this article that the problems arising for contextualism from the mentioned normative views are only apparent and can be resolved by acknowledging the fairly widespread phenomenon of non-obvious context-sensitivity (recently embraced by even some of contextualism's most ardent former critics). Building on recent insights about non-obvious context-sensitivity, the article outlines an (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2007). Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):387-394.score: 24.0
    Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. John MacFarlane (2007). Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. 240--250.score: 24.0
    According to Semantic Minimalism, every use of "Chiara is tall" (fixing the girl and the time) semantically expresses the same proposition, the proposition that Chiara is (just plain) tall. Given standard assumptions, this proposition ought to have an intension (a function from possible worlds to truth values). However, speakers tend to reject questions that presuppose that it does. I suggest that semantic minimalists might address this problem by adopting a form of "nonindexical contextualism," according to which the proposition invariantly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.score: 24.0
    In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth-conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported by Stanley's cases than interest-relative invariantism or other versions (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Martin Montminy (2009). Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.score: 24.0
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Wolfgang Freitag (2011). Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem. Acta Analytica 26 (3):273-284.score: 24.0
    The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Contextualism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 24.0
    There are various ways in which context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the context in which an action is performed might determine whether the action is morally right: though it is often wrong not to keep a promise, it might be permissible in certain contexts. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see particularism) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be a reason in a different context: whether it is a reason against (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Wayne A. Davis (2013). On Nonindexical Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):561-574.score: 24.0
    Abstract MacFarlane distinguishes “context sensitivity” from “indexicality,” and argues that “nonindexical contextualism” has significant advantages over the standard indexical form. MacFarlane’s substantive thesis is that the extension of an expression may depend on an epistemic standard variable even though its content does not. Focusing on ‘knows,’ I will argue against the possibility of extension dependence without content dependence when factors such as meaning, time, and world are held constant, and show that MacFarlane’s nonindexical contextualism provides no advantages over (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Lars Bo Gundersen (2009). Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia. Synthese 171 (3):387 - 397.score: 24.0
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Contextualist Theories of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.score: 24.0
    Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Joseph Shieber (2009). Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2012). Strong, Therefore Sensitive: Misgivings About DeRose's Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):237-253.score: 24.0
    According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Michael Hannon (2013). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.score: 24.0
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Sarah Wright (2010). Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.) (2005). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Martin Montminy (2013). The Role of Context in Contextualism. Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366.score: 24.0
    According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Christoph Jäger (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Analysis 72 (3):491-498.score: 24.0
    Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. David Braun (2013). Contextualism About 'Might' and Says-That Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):485-511.score: 24.0
    Contextualism about ‘might’ says that the property that ‘might’ expresses varies from context to context. I argue against contextualism. I focus on problems that contextualism apparently has with attitude ascriptions in which ‘might’ appears in an embedded ‘that’-clause. I argue that contextualists can deal rather easily with many of these problems, but I also argue that serious difficulties remain with collective and quantified says-that ascriptions. Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne atempt to deal with these remaining problems, but (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25.score: 24.0
    Two of the main forms of anti-scepticism in the contemporary literature—namely, neo-Mooreanism and attributer contextualism—share a common claim, which is that we are, contra the sceptic, able to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. This paper begins by surveying the relative merits of these views when it comes to dealing with the standard closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem that is focussed on the possession of knowledge. It is argued, however, that it is not enough to simply deal with (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Matthias Steup (2005). Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation. Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.score: 24.0
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Ben A. Minteer, Elizabeth A. Corley & Robert E. Manning (2004). Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle? The Case for a Pragmatic Contextualism. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17 (2):131-156.score: 24.0
    Many nonanthropocentric environmental ethicists subscribe to a ``principle-ist'''' approach to moral argument, whereby specific natural resource and environmental policy judgments are deduced from the prior articulation of a general moral principle. More often than not, this principle is one requiring the promotion of the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature. Yet there are several problems with this method of moral reasoning, including the short-circuiting of reflective inquiry and the disregard of the complex nature of specific environmental problems and policy arguments. In (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Ram Neta (2007). Contextualism and a Puzzle About Seeing. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):53-63.score: 24.0
    Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike any well- established type of semantic context-sensitivity in natural language.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Jay Newhard (2012). The Argument From Skepticism for Contextualism. Philosophia 40 (3):563-575.score: 24.0
    Epistemic contextualism was originally motivated and supported by the response it provides to skeptical paradox. Although there has been much discussion of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox, not much attention has been paid to the argument from skepticism for contextualism. Contextualists argue that contextualism accounts for the plausibility and apparent inconsistency of a set of paradoxical claims better than any classical invariantist theory. In this paper I focus on and carefully examine the argument from skepticism for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Nat Hansen (2013). A Slugfest of Intuitions: Contextualism and Experimental Design. Synthese 190 (10):1771-1792.score: 24.0
    This paper considers ways that experimental design can affect judgments about informally presented context shifting experiments. Reasons are given to think that judgments about informal context shifting experiments are affected by an exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments and by experimenter bias. Exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments may produce experimental artifacts by obscuring important differences of degree between the phenomena being investigated. Experimenter bias is an effect generated when, for example, experimenters disclose (even unconsciously) their own beliefs (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Martin Montminy (2008). Contextualist Resolutions of Philosophical Debates. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alastair Norcross (2005). Contextualism for Consequentialists. Acta Analytica 20 (2):80-90.score: 24.0
    If, as I have argued elsewhere, consequentialism is not fundamentally concerned with such staples of moral theory as rightness, duty, obligation, moral requirements, goodness (as applied to actions), and harm, what, if anything, does it have to say about such notions? While such notions have no part to play at the deepest level of the theory, they may nonetheless be of practical significance. By way of explanation I provide a linguistic contextualist account of these notions. A contextualist approach to all (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Elke Brendel (2014). Contextualism, Relativism, and the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):101-117.score: 24.0
    It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge rule of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Michael D. Ashfield (2013). Against the Minimalistic Reading of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to Wolfgang Freitag. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):111-125.score: 24.0
    Several philosophers have argued that the factivity of knowledge poses a problem for epistemic contextualism (EC), which they have construed as a knowability problem. On a proposed minimalistic reading of EC’s commitments, Wolfgang Freitag argues that factivity yields no knowability problem for EC. I begin by explaining how factivity is thought to generate a contradiction out of paradigmatic contextualist cases on a certain reading of EC’s commitments. This reductio results in some kind of reflexivity problem for the contextualist when (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 991