Deterrence is a theory which claims that punishment is justified through preventing future crimes, and is one of the oldest and most powerful theories about punishment. This volume brings together the leading work on deterrence from the dominant international figures in the field. Deterrence is examined from various critical perspectives, including its diversity, relation with desert, the relation of deterrence with incapacitation and prevention, the role deterrence has played in debates over the death penalty, and (...) deterrence and corporate crime. (shrink)

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant. -/- This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more (...) plausible deterrence theory of punishment—the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality. (shrink)

Minimum deterrence, though consistent with the nonaggression principle, is inadequate to deter states from invading anarchist territory and provides inadequate means of territorial defense when deterrence fails. In order to be effective, and thus attract clients, private defense agencies may want to adopt a military posture that incorporates first-strike counterforce and second-strike countervalue capabilities. To this end, they must acquire weapons of mass destruction—including tactical and strategic nuclear weapons—and long-range delivery vehicles capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory. (...) They must also decline to extend the nonaggression principle to states and individuals outside the voluntary defense network. Paradoxically, advertising such a posture while possessing a nuclear arsenal will save lives on both sides by minimizing the probability that anarchists must ever wage a defensive war at all. (shrink)

I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort (...) of deterrent theory which can avoid both of these objections. (shrink)

Nuclear deterrence requires objective ethical analysis. In providing it, the authors face realities - the Soviet threat, possible nuclear holocaust, strategic imperatives - but they also unmask moral evasions - deterrence cannot be bluff, pure counterforce, the lesser evil, or a step towards disarmament. They conclude that the deterrent is unjustifiable and examine the new question of conscience that this raises for everyone.

This article defends deterrence as an aim of punishment. Specifically, I contend that a system of punishment aimed at deterrence (with constraints to prohibit punishing the innocent or excessively punishing the guilty) is consistent with the liberal principle of respect for offenders as autonomous moral persons. I consider three versions of the objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect offenders. The first version, raised by Jeffrie Murphy and others, charges that deterrent punishment uses offenders as mere means to (...) securing the social good of crime reduction. The second and third are developed by R.A. Duff. The second holds that deterrent punishment inappropriately excludes offenders from the moral community. The third charges that deterrent punishment offers community members the wrong sorts of reasons to comply with the law. I conclude that each of these objections fails. A system of punishment aimed at deterrence (suitably constrained) is consistent with respect for offenders as moral persons. (shrink)

(1986). Deterrence and Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 161-193.

The just war tradition stands as the moral and prudential alternative to both pacifism and realism. It forms the only reasonable ethical basis for the understanding of state initiated force. As applied to questions of nuclear deterrence, just war theory is incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction and with the threat of MAD. Just war theory entails a move toward counterforce with discriminate targeting of military capabilities and away from city targeting. This is now becoming possible technically and is morally (...) indicated. The counterforce option is realistic in that nuclear disarmament is an extremely remote possibility and alternate strategies such as bluff ore not workable. A counterforce strategy would be both discriminate and proportional as well as being in accord with political realism. (shrink)

Deterrence in cyberspace is possible. But it requires an effort to develop a new domain-specific, conceptual, normative, and strategic framework. To be successful, cyber deterrence needs to shift from threatening to prevailing. I argue that by itself, deterrence is insufficient to ensure stability of cyberspace. An international regime of norms regulating state behaviour in cyberspace is necessary to complement cyber deterrence strategies and foster stability. Enforcing this regime requires an authority able to ensure States compliance with (...) the norms at an international level, run investigations into suspected State-run cyber operations to define attribution, expose breaches of the norms, and impose adequate sanctions and punishments. These requirements define a political mandate for an authority that will have a deep impact on international relations and geo-political equilibriums. The UN Security Council has the necessary resources and the political and coercive power to meet these requirements. The time has come to embrace this power to consolidate and enforce an international regime of norms to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace. Problems, mistakes, and even failures are to be expected, but they must not hinder the process. (shrink)

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This is a presentation of the utilitarian approach to punishment. It is meant for students. A note added in July, 2022 advises the reader about the author's current views on some topics in the paper. The first section discusses Bentham's psychological hedonism. The second briefly criticizes it. The third section explains abstractly how utilitarianism would determine of the right amount of punishment. The fourth section applies the theory to some cases, and brings out how utilitarianism could favor punishments more or (...) less severe than the lex talionis. (shrink)

Measures aimed at general deterrence are often thought to be problematic on the basis that they violate the Kantian prohibition against sacrificing the interests of some as a means of securing a greater good. But even if this looks like a weak objection because deterrence can be justified as a form of societal self-defence, such measures may be regarded as problematic for another reason: Harming in self-defence is only justified when it’s necessary, i.e., when there are no relatively (...) harmless alternatives. While there are few harmless ways to remove the threat posed by dangerous individuals, there are many relatively harmless methods for preventing crime. We can bracket off our preventative failings when we think of present threats, but we cannot do so when contemplating alternative preventative measures. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be (...) powerful, if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible. (shrink)

Nuclear deterrence has recently come under attack from many quarters. And philosophers, no less than others, have participated in the attack. The philosophical attacks have come both from consequentialists and deontologists. Deterrence has also, of course, found its defenders, but the latter have tended to be consequentialist or contractarian. I have not yet seen what I take to be a wholly adequate deontological defense of nuclear deterrence. In this essay, I attempt to make such a defense.

According to one influential tradition, to assert that p is to express a belief that p. Yet how do assertions provide strong evidence for belief? Philosophers have recently drawn on evolutionary biology to help explain the stability of assertive communication. Mitchell Green suggests that assertions are akin to biological handicaps. Peter Graham argues against the handicap view and instead claims that the norms of assertion are deterrents. Contra Graham, I argue that both mechanisms may play a role in assertive communication, (...) although assertions as deterrents will often fail to provide strong evidence for belief. (shrink)

It is widely held that the proper role of criminal punishment is to ensure in a cost-efficient manner that criminal laws will be obeyed. As James Buchanan puts it,the reason we have courts is not that we want people to be convicted of crimes but that we want people not to commit them. The whole procedure of the law is one, essentially, of threatening people with unpleasant consequences if they do things which are regarded as objectionable.According to the deterrence (...) theory of punishment, which I will here accept without argument in order to tease out some of its implications, legislators must be aware of opportunities to maximize the threat value of criminal prohibitions. By maximizing deterrence, we minimize the cost of crime. On the other hand, creating these threats, and carrying them out, is also costly. So we also wish to minimize the cost of avoiding crime. An efficient deterrent, therefore, will be one which minimizes the sum of the costs of crime and crime avoidance, where ‘cost’ is to be broadly construed. (shrink)

My thesis explores the possibility that the wrongful intentions principle might not apply in certain deterrent situations. WIP states that if it is wrong to do something under certain conditions, it is wrong to intend to do it should those conditions arise. Questions about applications of WIP are frequently raised in discussions about the morality of nuclear deterrence. Some philosophers, such as Gregory Kavka, maintain that in certain situations where gaining deterrence is important, it is morally permissible, and (...) perhaps even obligatory to form a sincere intention to retaliate although retaliation is wrong. ;The rejection of WIP causes paradoxes about relationships between good agents and right actions. Good and rational agents are unable to fulfill obligations to intend wrong, as their unwillingness to do wrong makes intending it impossible. Hence, the paradoxical conclusion that only a corrupt individual can do right in certain situations. ;The conclusion that in certain situations only corrupt agents can do right rests upon rejecting the WIP. I show that WIP applies in all deterrence situations and in all situations, period. Because WIP always applies, there are no situations where goodness and rationality prevent right action. ;Chapter one presents consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments to the conclusion that actual retaliation against civilian populations is wrong. In chapters two and three I argue that the kinds of situations discussed by Kavka and others doesn't warrant rejecting WIP. I maintain that non-consequentialist theories cannot permit agents to separate questions about intentions from questions about actions. Consequentialism cannot justify rejecting WIP in these situations either. Rejection of WIP implies that a corrupt leader is needed, and consequentialism cannot justify seeking such a leader. Chapter four argues that WIP must apply in all situations because it must be part of any action-guiding theory, either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. Talk of rejecting WIP is incoherent. Hence, because WIP always applies, goodness and rationality will never preclude right action, and whenever performing an action is wrong, intending to perform it is wrong as well. (shrink)

This article describes the important structural characteristics of a recently developed game-theoretic model of deterrence, summarizes the major deductions drown from it, and discusses its implications for both the theory of deterrence and the current strategic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows that a credible threat and a power advantage are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for stable deterrence. It also suggests that, even under ideal conditions, deterrence is an intricate and fundamentally fragile relationship that (...) rests, ultimately, upon the preferences and perceptions of key decision-makers rather than upon the nature and composition of each side’s strategic arsenal. (shrink)

While it is often argued that U.S. military strategy has gone through substantial changes over the post three decodes, it is not so clear if this is so, or why this should be so. Some changes in the real strategic problem of the west must be considered, including the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Changes in our perception of the problem may be at least as important, however, amid some possibilities of ‘Finlandisation’. Changes in the West’s opportunities must also (...) be considered, including ‘limited nuclear war’, and a totally conventional defense. Finally to be considered are the bureaucratic motivations of those advocating any such changes in western military postures, all of which suggest that current policies may still be better than the alternatives. (shrink)

This commentary briefly reviews the challenges associated with the concept of cyber deterrence. It considers the concept of deterrence more broadly before identifying the specific issues that make both deterrence by denial and by punishment particularly difficult in cyberspace. However, overall, it argues that the concept is valid and indeed essential in contributing to delivering strategic stability.

Recent indictments of sitting heads of state and rebel leaders engaged in ongoing conflicts are radically altering our conception of international criminal justice. But contrary to the mantra that justice delayed is justice denied, the most promising way to promote justice may be to postpone it.

,d simple example is used to analyze the issue ofimperfcsct obseruabilitt of commitmerit and to highlight the follotving phenor»enon: u'hen a player h«s tlie option of taking — at a cost — a (potentiality' deterring action, she is less lil.ely to do so cigainst an opponent rgho is aware of' tlie aoailabilitt' of tliis opticrn thaii against an opponent it her is not..

IntroductionIssues in public policy have been challenging and remaking moral theory for two centuries. Such issues force us to question fundamental principles of ethics while they cast doubt on our ability to generalize from traditional intuitions. No issue poses more remarkable difficulties for moral theory than nuclear weapons policy. Because the consequences of their deployment and therefore possible use could be grievous beyond those of any previously conceivable human action, these weapons frame the conflict between outcome-based, especially utilitarian, and action-based (...) deontological moral theories more acutely than perhaps any other we have faced. Just because nuclear weapons may bring about the most grievous outcome imaginable, they elevate concern with outcomes over concern with actions. More generally, they wreak havoc with the focus on the morality of individual choices and actions, set limits to the notion of intention and the doctrine of double effect, call into question the so-called just-war theory, and overwhelm the intuitionist basis of much of ethical reasoning. (shrink)