Problems of functional style differentiation of modern literary language are considered and analyzed in the article. Taking into account the communicative and pragmatic function, various substyles and sublanguages formed as a result of practical language usage in society are singled out on the example of the scientific style.
In Primitive Classification, Durkheim suggests using the notion of affectivity to explain the emergence of various social structures. This bold attempt to extend the role of affectivity in sociological thinking has been rejected by most social scientists. By greatly elaborating Durkheim's outline for a sociology of emotions, however, this essay suggests that there is a fruitful way to use affectivity in macrosociological theory. This model allows us to develop in a new way Durkheim's description of structural differentiation and stratification (...) in The Division of Labor in Society. (shrink)
Cellular pattern formations of some epithelia are believed to be governed by the direct lateral inhibition rule of cell differentiation. That is, initially equivalent cells are all competent to differentiate, but once a cell has differentiated, the cell inhibits its immediate neighbors from following this pathway. Such a differentiation repeats until all non-inhibited cells have differentiated. The cellular polygonal patterns can be characterized by the numbers of undifferentiated cells and differentiated ones. When the differentiated cells become large in (...) size, the polygonal pattern is deformed since more cells are needed to enclose the large cell. An actual example of such a cellular pattern was examined. The pupal wing epidermis of a butterfly Pieris rapae shows a transition of the equivalent-size cell pattern to the pattern involving large cells. The process of the transition was analyzed by using the method of weighted Voronoi tessellation that is useful for treatment of irregularly sized polygons. The analysis supported that the pattern transition of the early stage of the pupal wing epidermis is governed by the lateral inhibition rule. The differentiation takes place in order of largeness, but not smallness, of the apical polygonal area in the differentiating region of the pupal wing. (shrink)
The process of ?logical differentiation? was introduced by Peirce in 1870. Directly analogous to mathematical differentiation, it uses logical terms instead of mathematical variables. Here, this mysterious process receives new interpretations which serve to clarify Peirce?s use of logical terms. I introduce the logical terms, the operation of multiplication, the logical analogy to the binomial theorem, infinitesimal relatives, the concepts of numerical coefficients and the number associated with each term. I also analyse the algebraic development of ?logical (...) class='Hi'>differentiation? and consider in depth one application of the process. (shrink)
Evidence accumulates that pre- and postnatally circulating estrogens play an active role in the differentiation of the female brain: the susceptible period for feminization of the brain seems to extend far beyond the period during which masculinization of the brain occurs. Thus, there is a need to reevaluate the widely accepted “concept of basic femaleness” in sexual brain differentiation.
A high level of complexity and a continuous and always changing relationship among its elements characterizes modern world society. As a result, a constant differentiation and specialization of diverging social fields aiming to reduce the uncertainty emerging from that complexity takes place. Paradoxically, as differentiation and specialization increase, they become a new source of uncertainty. In order to confront this self-producing ambiguity, some social operations develop structural interdependencies with a sufficient level of operational stability that distinguish them from (...) their environment. In this paper this is called contextual differentiation, i.e. the emergence of differentiated contexts of interaction, decision and symbolization that make possible a mutilayered concretization of social functions in supranational contexts. With regard to the differentiation of law, economy and sports this process is analyzed and illustrated in four case studies: the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Bank for International Settlements, FIFA, the game and its publics, and the international commercial arbitration. La sociedad mundial moderna se caracteriza por su alta complejidad, es decir, por la continuamente cambiante interrelación de sus elementos. El resultado de ello es una constante diferenciación y especialización de espacios sociales orientada a manejar la incertidumbre que esa complejidad genera. Paradójicamente, la diferenciación y especialización es nuevamente una fuente de complejidad. Para enfrentar esta ambigüedad auto-producida, determinadas operaciones sociales se distinguen por generar interdependencias estructurales que logran una estabilidad operacional suficiente para distinguirlas de su entorno. A ello se le denomina en este artículo diferenciación contextual, esto es, la emergencia de contextos diferenciados de interacción, decisión y simbolización que posibilitan una concretización múltiple de funciones sociales en espacios supranacionales. Esto se observa especialmente a propósito de la diferenciación del derecho, la economía y el deporte, y se ilustra con cuatro estudios de caso: la Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, el Bank for International Settlements, la FIFA, el juego y sus públicos, y el arbitraje comercial internacional. (shrink)
Research in ethical decision making has consistently demonstrated a positive relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior, providing support for the “Monkey See, Monkey Do” perspective (e.g., Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, Acad Manage J 41:658–672, 1998 ). However, the boundaries of this relationship have received little research attention. Guided by theory and research in interpersonal distancing, we explore these boundaries by proposing and examining “moral differentiation,” the set of individual and situational characteristics that affect the degree to which (...) one is willing to be influenced by others’ unethical behavior. Using data from 655 undergraduate business students in two U.S. universities, we test moderating hypotheses regarding the influence of moral differentiation characteristics on the relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior. Results suggest that strong moral identity, low need for affiliation, and extraversion weaken the relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior. Implications for managers and future research are discussed. (shrink)
Heterocyst spacing in blue-green bacteria is widely assumed to be due to a diffusible inhibitor. The inhibitor, a nitrogen-rich compound, probably glutamine, is produced via the N2-fixing enzymes of the heterocyst and in turn serves to suppress the induction of these enzymes and of the differentiation of vegetative cells to heterocysts. This simple morphogenetic mechanism operating in growing cellular filaments ofAnabaena species is investigated on the basis of a continuous and a discrete cellular model, as well as by (...) cell-by-cell simulation of the inhibitor transport. The resulting distances between heterocysts and kinetics of their production are compared with observations, and the values of physical parameters are estimated from the models. (shrink)
The interrelationships among recent theories on the regulation of gene activity and differentiation in higher organisms are reviewed. Interpretations within these theories of the various components of chromosomes are re-evaluated and a unified conceptual framework of hierarchical genetic control mechanisms in eukaryotes is presented.
Studies of callosal sexual differentiation have concentrated on global measures of callosal size, using the rat as a model for studies of potential hormonal mechanisms. It is time to shift the study of callosal sexual differentiation to a more cellular level. Finally, there are potential problems with using the female rat as the primary model for understanding hormonal mechanisms during postnatal life.
When applied to a family of sets, the term differentiation designates a measure of the totality of those members which appear in only one of the sets. This basic set theoretic concept involves the formation of intersections, unions, and complements of sets. However, populations as special kinds of sets may share types, but they do not share the carriers of these types; intersections of different populations are thus always empty. The resulting conceptual dilemma is resolved by considering the joint (...) representation of members of different populations that have the same type; populations then intersect with respect to joint representation of types. Two forms of representation reflect relative and absolute characteristics of differentiation by accounting for the distributions of types as relative frequencies within populations (as is commonly done) and as absolute frequencies (including effects of population sizes on differentiation), respectively. Corresponding classes of differentiation measures are developed, and existing measures are discussed in relation to these classes. In particular, the affinity of the measurement of distances between populations and the special case of differentiation of two-population families is examined in order to distinguish between the notions of distance and differentiation. (shrink)
The differentiation of T Lymphocytes within the thymus is an important biological phenomenon during wich these cell acquire their functions to further control the immune system. Numerous experiments under various conditions have been devised to understand the different mechanisms involved in this complex process. Nevertheless, interpretation of these experiments lead to still contradictory debatable hypotheses. Modelisation of this process through classical simulation methods cannot be envisaged because they are not adapted to modifications of the model structure, which is the (...) point of interest. For these reasons, we proposed a new approach of automatic search for model. The program consists of four independent connected modules : The generator produces model, based on the rationale of formal grammars. Protocol and experimental data are stored in a set of experiments. The simulator using a protocol and a model provides simulated results. Finally, the supervisor by comparing simulated results and experimental data, adapts the model parameters to increase their fit and either chooses a new experiment to explore, or modifies the model structure. Change of the model structure is performed among still unexplored models according to their promise level, which is iteratively evaluated relatively to previously explored models through a proposed model distance. The generator is written in Prolog and the other modules in C++. The architecture of the program allows us to modify or complete a module without changing anything in the other modules. As a consequence, the proposed modeling approach conceived to study T lymphocyte differentiation within the thymus remains independent of this biological phenomenon and can be applied to other biological problems. (shrink)
Indirect routes by which gonadal hormones influence sexual differentiation are considered. In rats, differentiation may depend on the way in which the mother responds to the hormonal condition of her pups, and this has implications for the interpretation of the data for humans. Interaction between gonadal hormones and light experience in chicks is compared with the mammalian systems covered in Fitch & Denenberg's review.
We argue that estrogen feminization of the brain is the result of a series of events initiated by differential androgen exposure. There is no need to postulate a feminizing process parallel to androgen-induced masculinization to explain the findings.
Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated (...) in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley. (shrink)
The goal of this paper is to locate the precise moment in which reason becomes endowed with an ought. In stating the goal in this way, something has already been said about Kant and his project of grounding the metaphysics of morals. But in speaking of a moment (or an instant or an event or an occasion) in which reason becomes endowed with an ought, that is, a moment in which pure reason becomes practical, we have already headed off in (...) a direction beyond the metaphysics of morals. For by invoking the moment, we have invoked something concrete. This distinguishes the current project from the Kantian enterprise in that Kant sought the universal conditions of morality as they followed from a rationality already endowed with an ought. In so doing, he could identify that the ideas of morality and freedom were concomitantly related (along with reason itself), but he could not show that any of these ever materialized in concrete experience. Toward the end of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes, "we have finally traced the determinate concept of morality back to the idea of freedom, but we could not prove freedom to be something actual in ourselves and in human nature" (GMM 51). On the next page, he writes: ... we are not as yet able to have any insight into why it is that we should divorce ourselves from such interest, i.e., that we should consider ourselves as free in action and yet hold ourselves as subject to certain laws so as to find solely in our own person a worth that can compensate us for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition. We do not see how this is possible and hence how the moral law can obligate us. One must frankly admit that there is here a sort of circle from which, so it seems, there is no way to escape. (GMM 52. Emphasis is mine.) Even though Kant can align the concepts of freedom, reason and the moral law, it would seem that the obligating force of morality has slipped beneath his grip, and he is left to analyze the idea of moral obligation in its place.1 The present study seeks to return this idea of obligation to its origin.. (shrink)
This article recommends that we recover two old contrasts from the history of social thought in order to facilitate the recently renewed discussion of multiple variants of European political modernity. Recovering them greatly aids in clarifying the different "modernizing" paths that the European-system polities took during the state-consolidation and nation-building periods of the "long nineteenth century." Specifically, the basic polity forms delineated in this article capture strikingly well the distinctive "institutional logics" and political cultures of the Anglo, Nordic, Germanic, and (...) French orbits, legacies enduring through the 1960s and beyond. Clarifying these polity forms also helps in isolating underlying institutional changes occurring in the contemporary (post-World War II) period (current institutional convergence, for example). (shrink)
I consider the way in which spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. In section 1 I outline the operative conception of object seeing. I consider Cassam’s view that in order to see o, you must see it as spatially located (section 2). I argue that Cassam’s argument is unsound. Cassam’s argument relies on the claim that seeing o requires visual differentiation. But it is not the case that seeing o requires visual differentiation. This is because the following (...) principle is true: if S sees a visible proper part of o, then S sees o, and since there are cases in which S sees a visible proper part of o yet o is not visually differentiated for S , seeing o doesn’t require visual differentiation (section 3). In section 4 I suggest an alternative way of understanding the idea that spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. (shrink)
In making decisions regardmg what to do, people should employ plausible moral standards to defend what they think is morally permissible. One plausible moral standard that is often used is what I refer to as the Rational Person Standard: we, as rational agents, ought to choose the option that has the greatest benefit for us, under the constraint that what we choose does not unfairly limit other people from choosing what they think is best for them. Another way to phrase (...) this standard is: rational agents will not choose an action that will cause uimecessary and avoidable harm. In this paper I will apply this standard to an analysis of a systemic issue common to many moral problems, using sweatshops as an example, that, if ignored, may lead us to make, and act upon, arguments that seem plausible in one context, but ultimately fail when considered from another context. (shrink)
In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of qi has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, qi has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, qi is similar to air, and it is essentially similar to the matter-energy or field in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the (...) meanings of qi in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of qi on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about qi, such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. (shrink)
Collection of published and unpublished essays covering most of my work up to 1990. Chapters 1 & 2 are about orthodox economics. Chapter 3 is the infamous pseudonymous spoof of Nozick, whose context and reaction is explained in the introduction. Chapter 4 puts the labor theory of property and democratic theory in a Kantian framework of treating persons as ends in themselves (instead of as rentable instruments of production). Chapter 5 shows how to reformulate marginal productivity theory using the fact (...) that while many factors are causally efficacious, only labor is responsible human action. Chapter 6 gives the first mathematical formulation of double entry bookkeeping which was necessary for the labor theory of property treatment of the stocks and flows of property within a firm. Chapter 7 gives the independent and more technical treatment of what eventually became known as John Searles differentiation of minds and machines. Chapter 8 shows how the old philosophical notions of a concrete universal is perfectly modeled by the universal objects of category theory. The other chapters develop various mathematical ideas in a fairly accessible form. (shrink)
A panel titled Feminist Philosophy after Twenty Years was organized by Carol C. Gould for the session sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women at the American Philosophical Association's 1993 Eastern Division Meeting, December 30, 1993 in Atlanta, GA. The remarks of the three panelists, Linda Lopez McAlister, Ann Ferguson and Kathy Addelson are printed below.
There is some very limited evidence for a role of estrogens in human psychosexual masculinization; its interpretation is uncertain. Fitch & Denenberg's demonstration of a role for estrogens in the behavioral feminization of nonhuman mammals implicitly suggests an answer to a riddle posed by the syndrome of congenital adrenal hyperplasia in women.
The current major models of coexistence of species on the same resources are briefly summarized. It is then shown that analysis of supposedly competitive systems in terms of the physical four dimensions of phase-space is sufficient to understand the causes for coexistence and for competitive exclusion. Thus, the multiple dimensions of niche theory are reduced to factors which define the magnitudes of the phase-spatial system, in particular the boundaries of population spaces and of periods of activity. Excluding possible cooperative interaction (...) between consumers, it appears that coexistence of species on thesame kind of limiting resource is possible only in cases of compartmentalization either in space, or in time, of resource consumption, i.e. if each consumer species disposes of a separate resource supply. Three criteria were found to be decisive for successful compartmentalization (i.e. for coexistence): 1. the vector of the resource flow; 2. relative mobility between consumers and resource units; 3. dependence or independence of resource flow on previous consumption. The traditional terminology of niche theory and of competition theory in general proved to be inadequate for analytical treatment of problems of coexistence. (shrink)
This paper presents a evolutionary simulation where the presence of 'tags' and an inbuilt specialisation in terms of skills result in the development of 'symbiotic' sharing within groups of individuals with similar tags. It is shown that the greater the number of possible sharing occasions there are the higher the population that is able to be sustained using the same level of resources. The 'life-cycle' of a particular cluster of tag-groups is illustrated showing: the establishment of sharing; a focusing-in of (...) the cluster; the exploitation of the group by a particular skill-group and the waning of the group. This simulation differs from other tag-based models in that is does not rely on either the forced donation of resources to individuals with the same tag and where the tolerance mechanism plays a significant part. These 'symbiotic' groups could provide the structure necessary for the true emergence of artificial societies, supporting a division of labour similar to that found in human societies. (shrink)
Cognition or higher brain activity is sometimes seen as a phenomenon greater than the sum of its parts. This viewpoint however is largely dependent on the state of the art of experimental techniques that endeavor to characterize morphology and its association to function. Retinal ganglion cells are readily accessible for this work and we discuss recent advances in computational techniques in identifying novel parameters that describe structural attributes possibly associated with specific function. These parameters are based on calculating wavelet gradients (...) from cell images followed by the extraction of meaningful measures including 2nd wavelet moment, entropy of orientation, and curvature. For the three cell types analyzed, the mean 2nd wavelet moment, which relates to the field of influence of the dendritic-tree segments was significantly different. cells had the highest mean 2nd wavelet moment, followed by the and cells (134 ± 22, 93 ± 19 and 63 ± 12, respectively). There was no significant difference between cells for entropy of orientation, indicating no class with a preferential orientation of their dendritic tree. Curvature provided similar results to the 2nd wavelet moment with cells having the highest curvature followed by and the cells (mean ± SD: 161 ± 15; 134 ± 22; 121 ± 15). Our feature space analysis also indicated a difference between these cell types. No difference was found between the and cell types and their physiological counterparts the Y and X cells based on wavelet analysis. Both the X and Y cells can be divided into two subtypes, the ON- and OFF-center cells based on the stratification level of the dendritic tree within the retina. Using 2nd wavelet moment, a difference in their morphological attributes, not reported previously, was noted for these subtypes. The 2nd wavelet moment and curvature are further discussed with respect to explaining regularity of spacing and coverage associated with retinal ganglion cell mosaics. (shrink)
For the last 50 years the dominant stance in experimental biology has been reductionism in general, and genetic reductionism in particular. Philosophers were the first to realize that the belief that the Mendelian genes were reduced to DNA molecules was questionable. Soon, experimental data confirmed these misgivings. The optimism of molecular biologists, fueled by early success in tackling relatively simple problems has now been tempered by the difficulties encountered when applying the same simple ideas to complex problems. We analyze three (...) examples taken from experimental data that illustrate the shortcomings of this sort of reductionism. In the first, alterations in the expression of a large number of genes coexist with normal phenotypes at supra-cellular levels of organization; in the second, the supposed intrinsic specificity of hormonal signals is negated; in the third, the notion that cancer is a cellular problem caused by mutated genes is challenged by data gathered both from the reductionist viewpoint and the alternative view proposing that carcinogenesis is development gone awry. As an alternative to reductionism, we propose that the organicist view is a good starting point from which to explore these phenomena. However, new theoretical concepts are needed to grapple with the apparent circular causality of complex biological phenomena. (shrink)
The ethical tension over whether countries have differentiated responsibilities for climate change mitigation evokes the tale of a master and a man. The one who thinks she is the master is analogous to the wealthier, industrialized nations and their market actors, and the human is the rest of humanity, particularly those citizens of less developed countries. Since 1992, there has been formal, stated agreement that there should be differentiated responsibilities for climate change mitigation between developed and developing nations, but (...) class='Hi'>differentiation remained a sticking point in negotiations over implementation at Copenhagen in 2009. Putting the parties in the climate change differentiation debate in analogy with the characters of Tolstoy’s story, “Master and Man,” this paper seeks to advance the common appreciation for the moral foundations of differentiation. (shrink)
Chinese culture is neither the first problematic thinking (analogy) claimed by the authors of Anticipating China , nor the second one (logical inference). On the one hand, analogies are one of the most remarkable aspects of Chinese thinking, while on the other hand, Yin-Yang, Dao and Fo are all universal codes that could neither be reached by analogy nor by logical inference. In fact, both the first and second problematic thinking share the same world view, taking the world as a (...) composite, and the difference lies merely in whether the components are irreplaceable particulars or substitutable elements. Both build their knowledge on the components and how they combine. In the terms of this paper, both systems are constructed with spatially definable forms, real or nominal. The highest codes in Chinese culture are not built upon the physical properties of an object, and could never be found by analysing the object, physically or logically. Yin-Yang, Dao and Fo are names without form, and thus are thinking modes that cannot be described by a spatial concept. They are non-structural systems and a way of formless thinking. (shrink)
Hrushovski proved that the theory of difference-differential fields of characteristic zero has a model-companion, which we shall denote DCFA. Previously, the author proved that this theory is supersimple. In supersimple theories there is a notion of rank defined in analogy with Lascar U-rank for superstable theories. It is also possible to define a notion of dimension for types in DCFA based on transcendence degree of realization of the types. In this paper we compute the rank of a model of DCFA, (...) give some properties regarding rank and dimension, and give an example of a definable set with finite rank but infinite dimension. Finally we prove that for the case of definable subgroup of the additive group being finite-dimensional and having finite rank are equivalent. (shrink)
Prominent positions in the contemporary theoretical field of the humanities tend to conceptualize late modern communities in general as aesthetic communities of taste. In regard to political communities, this means reducing the political to an implication of the aesthetic discourse. This article argues for addressing the aesthetic and the political as distinct discourses that are, on the other hand, always engaged with each other in a conflictual interplay. Both discourses draw on and appeal to the ability of judgement, but according (...) to their own distinct principles, and depending on their respective weight in the conflictual interplay, this entails quite different perspectives with regards to political practice and community formation. (shrink)
Geometry was a main source of inspiration for Carnap’s conventionalism. Taking Poincaré as his witness Carnap asserted in his dissertation Der Raum (Carnap 1922) that the metrical structure of space is conventional while the underlying topological structure describes "objective" facts. With only minor modifications he stuck to this account throughout his life. The aim of this paper is to disprove Carnap's contention by invoking some classical theorems of differential topology. By this means his metrical conventionalism turns out to be indefensible (...) for mathematical reasons. This implies that the relation between to-pology and geometry cannot be conceptualized as analogous to the relation between the meaning of a proposition and its expression in some language as logical empiricists used to say. (shrink)
In Hegel ou Spinoza,1 Pierre Macherey challenges the influence of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza by stressing the degree to which Spinoza eludes the grasp of the Hegelian dialectical progression of the history of philosophy. He argues that Hegel provides a defensive misreading of Spinoza, and that he had to “misread him” in order to maintain his subjective idealism. The suggestion being that Spinoza’s philosophy represents, not a moment that can simply be sublated and subsumed within the dialectical progression of the (...) history of philosophy, but rather an alternative point of view for the development of a philosophy that overcomes Hegelian idealism. Gilles Deleuze also considers Spinoza’s philosophy to resist the totalising effects of the dialectic. Indeed, Deleuze demonstrates, by means of Spinoza, that a more complex philosophy antedates Hegel’s, which cannot be supplanted by it. Spinoza therefore becomes a significant figure in Deleuze’s project of tracing an alternative lineage in the history of philosophy, which, by distancing itself from Hegelian idealism, culminates in the construction of a philosophy of difference. It is Spinoza’s role in this project that will be demonstrated in this paper by differentiating Deleuze’s interpretation of the geometrical example of Spinoza’s Letter XII (on the problem of the infinite) in Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza,2 from that which Hegel presents in the Science of Logic.3. (shrink)
Ecological fitness has been suggested to provide a unifying definition of fitness. However, a metric for this notion of fitness was in most cases unavailable except by proxy with differential reproductive success. In this article, I show how differential persistence of lineages can be used as a way to assess ecological fitness. This view is inspired by a better understanding of the evolution of some clonal plants, colonial organisms, and ecosystems. Differential persistence shows the limitation of an ensemblist noncausal understanding (...) of evolution. Causal explanations are necessary to understand the evolution by natural selection of these biological systems. †To contact the author write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Centre‐Ville, Montreal, Quebec, H3C 3J7 Canada; e‐mail: f.bouchard@umontreal.ca. (shrink)
When is one person entitled to sanction another for moral wrongdoing? When, instead, must one mind one’s own business? Stephen Darwall argues that the legitimacy of social sanctioning is essential to the very concept of moral obligation. But, I will argue, Darwall’s “second person” theory of accountability unfortunately implies that every person is entitled to sanction every wrongdoer for every misdeed. In this essay, I defend a set of principles for differentiating those who have the standing to sanction from those (...) who do not. (shrink)
This paper critically reviews phenomenological philosophy of the body in light of postmodern and postcolonial critiques of universalism. It aims to recast the notion of the lived body in plural rather than singular terms. It does so within the context of phenomenology and dance, using cultural anthropology to highlight the sense in which bodies are culturally and corporeally specific. The notion of corporeal specificity is applied to the perception of dance, paying particular attention to questions of power and hegemony. This (...) is not to reject phenomenology, but to differentiate it according to its social, historical and kinaesthetic milieux. (shrink)
It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...) visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable, and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters. (shrink)
Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents’ networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement (...) of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness predicted disapproval of false promises and misrepresentation. Empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the analysis. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy. (shrink)
To have the burden of proof is to be rationally required to argue for or provide evidence for your position. To have a heavier burden than an opponent is to be rationally required to provide better evidence or better arguments than they are required to provide. Many commentators suggest that differential or uneven distribution of the burden of proof is ubiquitous. In reasoned discourse, the idea goes, it is almost always the case that one party must prove the claim at (...) issue to prevent the opposing view winning by default. The following passage is typical of the sort of thing one finds in critical thinking textbooks. (shrink)
The present essay on the being of the sensible investigates the individuation of intensity differentials. This is Deleuze's theme in the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, where he places individuation in the context of his ‘transcendental empiricism’. The mechanisms of subjectivation are conceived as spatially-temporally determined actualisations (of the virtual) whose implicit intensity relations are neither accessible empirically nor are they governed by transcendental conditions (in the conventional sense). Central to the discussion is the distinction, stemming from Kant, between (...) intensive and extensive magnitudes. (shrink)
The “DNA is a program” metaphor is still widely used in Molecular Biology and its popularization. There are good historical reasons for the use of such a metaphor or theoretical model. Yet we argue that both the metaphor and the model are essentially inadequate also from the point of view of Physics and Computer Science. Relevant work has already been done, in Biology, criticizing the programming paradigm. We will refer to empirical evidence and theoretical writings in Biology, although our arguments (...) will be mostly based on a comparison with the use of differential methods (in Molecular Biology: a mutation or alike is observed or induced and its phenotypic consequences are observed) as applied in Computer Science and in Physics, where this fundamental tool for empirical investigation originated and acquired a well-justified status. In particular, as we will argue, the programming paradigm is not theoretically sound as a causal(as in Physics) or deductive(as in Programming) framework for relating the genome to the phenotype, in contrast to the physicalist and computational grounds that this paradigm claims to propose. (shrink)
My 1953 proof that the function is everywhere continuous and nowhere differentiable is just 13 lines. I've added some remarks to the note in the American Mathematical Monthly.
Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different vagueness of spatiotemporal boundaries from neural events to the claim that mental events are not identical to neural events. In response, I argue that this presupposes an ontological account of vagueness that there is no reason to believe in this (...) context. I further argue that Pietroski's reasons for rejecting the possibility that mental events are vaguely constituted from neural events are inadequate. I go on to show how Pietroski's Personal Dualism is ill-equipped to deal with the problem of mental causation because of its apparently necessary appeal to ceteris paribus laws. (shrink)
Justifications of group-differentiated rights commonly overlook a crucial practical consideration: if rights are to be allocated on the basis of group membership, how should we determine which individuals belong to which group? Assuming that social identities are fixed and transparent runs the risk of creating further injustices, whilst acknowledging that social groups are porous and heterogeneous runs the risk of rendering group-differentiated rights impracticable. In this paper, I develop a schema for determining group membership which avoids both horns of this (...) dilemma. (shrink)
I describe two approaches to modelling the universe, the one having its origin in topos theory and differential geometry, the other in set theory. The first is synthetic differential geometry. Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with (...) a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F.. (shrink)
Diagrams have played an important role throughout the entire history of differential equations. Geometrical intuition, visual thinking, experimentation on diagrams, conceptions of algorithms and instruments to construct these diagrams, heuristic proofs based on diagrams, have interacted with the development of analytical abstract theories. We aim to analyze these interactions during the two centuries the classical theory of differential equations was developed. They are intimately connected to the difficulties faced in defining what the solution of a differential equation is and in (...) describing the global behavior of such a solution. (shrink)
In considering the argument that Thomas Szasz advances on behalf of his claim that there is no mental illness, it becomes evident that despite his stated assumptions, moral valuations are necessarily tied up with assessment of disease. By following his remarks about differential diagnosis, it becomes evident that behavior is the occasion for differential diagnosis, that behavior determines which anatomical deviations are counted as diseases, and that Szasz's insistence on autonomy introduces his own moral assumptions into the concept of disease. (...) Consequently, although none of these considerations disproves Szasz's conclusions about the existence of mental illness, neither can his argument support the weight of that conclusion. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den Brink (...) fairness axiom on large classes of games. (shrink)
Political theorists, increasingly, are realizing the virtues of contextuality to conceptual analysis. Just as theory may provide useful standards for the assessment of political practices, so may application of theoretical constructs within particular contexts provide a critical corrective to theory. This essay relates work undertaken within sociolegal studies applying a constitutive methodology to such efforts to contextualize political theorizing. The essay describes how the emphasis placed by constitutive theory on locality and meaning entails a contextual analysis. The essay then demonstrates (...) how a constitutive and contextual approach can enhance our understanding of the moral issues surrounding differentiated citizenship policy. While the most obvious cost associated with differentiated citizenship policy is a loss in formal equality, a contextual assessment demonstrates the prospect of an even deeper, though ultimately contingent, moral loss in self-invention. (shrink)
In this paper we set out the basic model theory of differential fields of characteristic 0, which have finitely many commuting derivations. We give axioms for the theory of differentially closed differential fields with m derivations and show that this theory is ω-stable, model complete, and quantifier-eliminable, and that it admits elimination of imaginaries. We give a characterization of forking and compute the rank of this theory to be ω m + 1.
Hrushovski proved that the theory of difference-differential fields of characteristic zero has a model-companion, which we shall denote DCFA. Previously, the author proved that this theory is supersimple. In supersimple theories there is a notion of rank defined in analogy with Lascar U -rank for superstable theories. It is also possible to define a notion of dimension for types in DCFA based on transcendence degree of realization of the types. In this paper we compute the rank of a model of (...) DCFA, give some properties regarding rank and dimension, and give an example of a definable set with finite rank but infinite dimension. Finally we prove that for the case of definable subgroup of the additive group being finite-dimensional and having finite rank are equivalent. (shrink)
Fields of characteristic zero with several commuting derivations can be treated as fields equipped with a space of derivations that is closed under the Lie bracket. The existentially closed instances of such structures can then be given a coordinate-free characterization in terms of differential forms. The main tool for doing this is a generalization of the Frobenius Theorem of differential geometry.
The mere exposure effect is the increase in positive affect that results from the repeated exposure to previously novel stimuli. We sought to determine if judgments other than affective preference could reliably produce a mere exposure effect for two-dimensional random shapes. In two experiments, we found that brighter and darker judgments did not differentiate target from distracter shapes, liking judgments led to target selection greater than chance, and disliking judgments led to distracter selection greater than chance. These results for brighter, (...) darker, and liking judgments were obtained regardless of whether shape recognition was greater (Experiment 1) or not greater (Experiment 2) than chance. Effects of prior exposure to novel shapes were reliably observed only for affective judgment tasks. These results are inconsistent with general predictions made by the nonspecific activation hypothesis, but not the affective primacy or perceptual fluency hypotheses which were discussed in terms of cognitive neuroscience research. (shrink)
We investigate the provability or nonprovability of certain ordinary mathematical theorems within certain weak subsystems of second order arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the Cauchy/Peano existence theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, in the context of the formal system RCA 0 whose principal axioms are ▵ 0 1 comprehension and Σ 0 1 induction. Our main result is that, over RCA 0 , the Cauchy/Peano Theorem is provably equivalent to weak Konig's lemma, i.e. the statement that every infinite {0, 1}-tree (...) has a path. We also show that, over RCA 0 , the Ascoli lemma is provably equivalent to arithmetical comprehension, as is Osgood's theorem on the existence of maximum solutions. At the end of the paper we digress to relate our results to degrees of unsolvability and to computable analysis. (shrink)
Physicists often allow the "laws" of a discipline, formulated as partial differential equations, to be disobeyed along various surfaces, arrayed along the boundary and inside the medium under study. What kinds of considerations permit these lapses in the applicability of the equations? This paper surveys a variety of answers found in the physical literature.
The question of whether fluid intelligence can be differentiated from general intelligence in older adults is addressed. Data indicate that the developmental pattern of performance on fluid tasks differs from the pattern of general intelligence. These results suggest that it is important to identify changes in fluid cognitive functions associated with frontal lobe decline, as they may be early indicators of cognitive decline. (Published Online April 5 2006).
We report the results of two studies that evaluated the perceptions of supervisor and top leader ethics. In our first study, we re-analyzed data from Pelletier and Bligh (J Bus Ethics 67:359–374, 2006 ) and found that the Perceptions of Ethical Leadership Scale from that study could be used to differentiate perceptions of supervisor and top leader ethics. In a second study with a different sample, we examined the relationships between (1) individual employees’ perceptions of top managers’ and immediate supervisors’ (...) ethical tendencies, and (2) organizational climate, confidence in top leadership direction, commitment, and citizenship behavior. Results indicated that employee perceptions of top managers’ and supervisors’ ethics were significantly related to climate, top leadership direction, organizational commitment and the OCB dimension, civic virtue. (shrink)
We revisit the Nowak (Int J Game Theory 26:137–141, 1997) characterization of the Banzhaf value via 2-efficiency, the Dummy player axiom, symmetry, and marginality. In particular, we provide a brief proof that also works within the classes of superadditive games and of simple games. Within the intersection of these classes, one even can drop marginality. Further, we show that marginality and symmetry can be replaced by van den Brink fairness/differential marginality. For this axiomatization, 2-efficiency can be relaxed into superadditivity on (...) the full domain of games. (shrink)
We welcome Blair's argument that the relationship between fluid cognition and other aspects of intelligence should be an important focus of research, but are less convinced by his arguments that fluid intelligence is dissociable from general intelligence. This is due to confusions between (a) crystallized skills and g, and (b) universal and differential constructs. (Published Online April 5 2006).
This article is the second one in a series dealing with mental health ethics in Cuba. It reports on ethical dilemmas, resources and limitations to their resolution, and recommendations for action. The data, obtained through individual interviews and focus groups with 28 professionals, indicate that Cubans experience dilemmas related to (a) the interests of clients, (b) their personal interests, and (c) the interest of the state. These conflicts are related to power differentials among (a) clients and professionals, (b) professionals from (...) various disciplines, and (c) professionals and organizational authorities. Resources to solve ethical dilemmas include government support, ethics committees, and collegial dialogue. Limitations include minimal training in ethics, lack of safe space to discuss professional disagreements, and little tolerance for criticism. Recommendations to address ethical dilemmas include better training, implementation of a code of ethics, and provision of safe space to discuss ethical dilemmas. The findings are discussed in light of the role of power in applied ethics. (shrink)
Differential academic language proficiency is an issue of major educational concern, bearing on problems varying from pupil performance, to social prospects, and citizenship. In this paper we develop a conception of the language-acquiring subject, and we discuss the consequences for understanding differential language proficiency in schools. Starting from Wittgenstein's meaning-as-use theory we show that learning a language requires an activity that relates the subject both to the community of language users, and to the things language is about. In opposition to (...) Luntley, we contend that this does not mean that linguistic development involves linguistic adjustment to the world 'as it is'. It is argued that, in as far as linguistic development involves a process of adjustment, this concerns conceptions about the world as it is presupposed to be—a 'world' that is subjected to doubt and revision time and again. With respect to dealing with differential academic language proficiency, this approach to linguistic development suggests bringing pupils into situations which require active participation in processes of 'negotiating meaning', including negotiating the prevailing presuppositions about what the world is like. This also puts novices in a different position—less assimilatory—recognising their co-constructive potencies at a more fundamental level. (shrink)
Multi-level discrete models of genetic networks, or the more general piecewise affine differential models, provide qualitative information on the dynamics of the system, based on a small number of parameters (such as synthesis and degradation rates). Boolean models also provide qualitative information, but are based simply on the structure of interconnections. To explore the relationship between the two formalisms, a piecewise affine differential model and a Boolean model are compared, for the carbon starvation response network in E. coli . The (...) asymptotic dynamics of both models are shown to be quite similar. This study suggests new tools for analysis and reduction of biological networks. (shrink)
(2012). Inviting People to Climate Parties: Differentiating National and Individual Responsibilities for Mitigation. Ethics, Policy & Environment: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 309-313. doi: 10.1080/21550085.2012.730242.
How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...) defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them. (shrink)
Justificationism differs from realism about how linguistic meaning is given, and hence in its associated conception of truth, and in particular in rejecting bivalence. Empirical discourse differs from mathematical primarily in that an effective decision-procedure for an empirical statement may cease to be available at a later time. The contrast is not that empirical knowledge is derived from what is mind-dependent, namely perception, whereas mathematical knowledge is not so derived. Mathematical knowledge does not accrue simply because a proof exists: the (...) proof has to be understood and recognized to be valid. Most ordinary mathematical proofs are indirect: they supply an effective means, in principle, to construct a direct or canonical proof. An indirect justification for asserting an empirical statement does not, in general, supply a means for bringing into existence a direct justification; it merely provides a ground for supposing that a direct justification would be or have been available for someone suitably placed to make the necessary observations. But it is by what constitutes direct evidence for a statement that its meaning is given; a grasp of its meaning does not rest on an ability to survey all conceivable indirect evidence. A direct justification of an empirical statement of the kind capable of being used as a report of observation must be an actual or possible observation by a suitably placed observer. A possible observation need not be explained by means of a counterfactual: it may be taken as consisting of the appropriate physical stimuli. This way of understanding it evades all three of the untenable choices Peacocke offers the justificationist. Unlike mathematical ones, empirical statements are often justifiably asserted on probabilistic grounds. When the statement admits of a conclusive justification, probabilistic evidence will not figure as a direct justification for asserting it, and hence as determining its meaning, so no circularity is involved, as Peacocke charges. There may, however, be empirical statements that can neither be reports of observation nor admit of a conclusive justification. Such statements can be asserted only on inductive or abductive grounds; this goes to characterize their meanings. Their meanings must therefore be explained by specifying such grounds as the most direct justifications of them that can be given, although they are difeasible rather than conclusive. Peacocke appears to deny that there can be statements that transcend all possible verification. To vindicate such a view from a realist standpoint is surely very difficult: it requires a demonstration that we could not grasp what it would be for such a statement to be true. It is very obscure what a realist's conception of truth is. The principle of bivalence remains a strong mark of differentiation between a justificationist and a realist conception of truth; a clear argument why the principle should be accepted would greatly help to clarify how the realist conceives of truth. I enjoyed reading Peacocke's article, but remain as perplexed as I was before just how he does conceive of truth. (shrink)
Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn''t be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will (...) argue that there is nothing in Derrida''s philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze''s work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming. (shrink)
I use Jonathan Bennett’s, Gilles Deleuze’s and Pierre Macherey’s interpretations of Spinoza to extract a theory of time and duration from Spinoza. I argue that although time can be considered a product of the imagination, duration is a real property of existing things and corresponds to their essence, taking essence (as Deleuze does) as a degree of power of existing. The article then explores the relations among time, duration, essence and eternity, arguing against the idea that Spinoza’s essences or Spinoza’s (...) eternity are atemporal. Essences and eternity both involve necessary references to time, but the time involved is not that of the “fortuitous sequence of events” apprehended through sensory experience. Rather, the “time” is that implicit in the necessity of God’s self-determination through God’s differentiation into natura naturans and natura naturata, which is involved in the production and differentiation of eternal essences. (shrink)
